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THE GERRYMANDER AND THE CONSTITUTION:
TWO AVENUES OF ANALYSIS AND THE QUEST FOR A
DURABLE PRECEDENT
EDWARD B. FOLEY*
ABSTRACT
It has been notoriously difficult for the United States Supreme
Court to develop a judicially manageable—and publicly comprehen-
sible—standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims,
a standard comparable in this respect to the extraordinarily
successful “one person, one vote” principle articulated in the Reappor-
tionment Revolution of the 1960s. This difficulty persists because the
quest has been for a gerrymandering standard that is universalistic
in the same way that “one person, one vote” is: derived from abstract
ideas of political theory, like the equal right of citizens to participate
in electoral politics. But other domains of constitutional law employ
particularistic modes of reasoning in sharp contrast to the universal-
ism of the “one person, one vote” principle. Particularism can provide
a judicially manageable standard for partisan gerrymandering
claims by making the original gerrymander—the one that provided
the name for this category of pernicious partisanship—a fixed
historical benchmark to judge the distortion of legislative districts.
This particularistic reasoning should be persuasive to Justice
Anthony Kennedy, especially if rooted in the First Amendment (home
to other well-known examples of particularistic analysis), and if also
combined with a cogent explanation why the First Amendment right
must remain “judicially underenforced” relative to its potential scope
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on universalistic grounds, because of the barrier imposed by the
political question doctrine’s need for a judicially manageable stan-
dard. Particularism, in other words, defines not necessarily the full
First Amendment right from a theoretical perspective, but only the
judicially enforceable portion of it. Even more important than per-
suading Justice Kennedy, however, is convincing a Supreme Court
controlled by conservative Justices—after Justice Kennedy has been
replaced by another Justice like Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel
Alito, or Neil Gorsuch—not to overrule an opinion in which Justice
Kennedy has identified a judicially manageable standard for
invalidating partisan gerrymanders as unconstitutional. On this
crucial point, particularism has distinct advantages over universal-
ism, including facilitating the possibility that the Justice Kennedy-
authored precedent quickly becomes imbedded in the nation’s
political culture, and because the public easily understands (and
embraces) a precedent that renders unconstitutional a district as
disfigured as the original gerrymander. A precedent that becomes an
integral element of America’s public self-understanding in this way
is one that conservatives on the Court would have difficulty overrul-
ing and, indeed, little interest in repudiating insofar as it is histori-
cally grounded and limited by the kind of particularistic reasoning
that conservatives consider acceptable.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since Vieth v. Jubelirer,1 the effort has been to develop a
judicially enforceable standard that will convince Justice Anthony
Kennedy to invalidate a partisan gerrymander as unconstitutional.2
The so-called “symmetry standard” did not work in League of United
Latin American Citizens (LULAC ) v. Perry, at least not all by itself.3
Now the focus is on the “efficiency gap” as an alternative measure
of partisan bias.4 There is also the attempt to use the First Amend-
ment, as Justice Kennedy himself suggested in Vieth,5 as a more
promising constitutional vehicle than equal protection for formulat-
ing a judicially manageable method of identifying when a redistrict-
ing map is infected with excess partisanship.6 Now that the Court
has under review the case from Wisconsin, Gill v. Whitford,7 the
1. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
2. See Richard L. Hasen, Justice Kennedy’s Beauty Pageant, ATLANTIC (June 19, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/justice-kennedys-beauty-pageant/530790/
?utm_source=twb [https://perma.cc/2GY5-3JSR].
3. After observing that “one of the amici proposes a symmetry standard that would mea-
sure partisan bias by ‘compar[ing] how both parties would fare hypothetically if they each (in
turn) had received a given percentage of the vote,’” Justice Kennedy opined: “Without alto-
gether discounting its utility in redistricting planning and litigation, I would conclude asym-
metry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship.” 548 U.S. 399, 419-20
(2006) (plurality opinion) (quoting Brief for King et al. at 5, LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399
(2006) (No. 05-204)).
4. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the
Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 851-52 (2015) (defining the “efficiency gap” metric). The
efficiency gap is the heart of the lawsuit, now before the Supreme Court, against Wisconsin’s
districting of its legislative assembly. See Jo Craven McGinty, The Numbers: Formula Mea-
sures Impact of Partisan Gerrymandering, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/formula-measures-impact-of-partisan-gerrymandering-1498222800 [https://perma.
cc/D2NT-93P5].
5. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The First
Amendment may be the more relevant constitutional provision in future cases that allege
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.”).
6. The First Amendment is the focus of a lawsuit that attacks the blatant gerrymander-
ing of Maryland’s congressional districts. See Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 7(a)-(c), 10,
Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799 (D. Md. 2017) (No. 1:13-cv-03233-JKB), ECF No. 44.
Professor Daniel Tokaji’s contribution to this Symposium also rests specifically on the First
Amendment. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Gerrymandering and Association, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2159, 2162-64 (2018) (positing three reasons why the First Amendment’s protection of
expressive association is the strongest basis for partisan gerrymandering claims).
7. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), argued, No.
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fervent hope of many is that Justice Kennedy will find himself
persuaded by one of these new approaches.8
It should be evident, however, that it is not enough to convince
Justice Kennedy that the judiciary is capable of condemning parti-
san gerrymanders as unconstitutional.9 Putting aside the obvious
need to hold on to the votes of the four Democratic appointees to the
Court,10 there is the issue of whether Justice Kennedy’s replacement
on the Court—after he steps down—will adhere to a precedent that
subjects gerrymanders to judicial invalidation. In other words, it
does no good for Justice Kennedy and the four Democratic appoint-
ees to strike down a gerrymander in the spring of 2018, if Justice
Kennedy leaves the bench later that year (or the next) and Presi-
dent Donald Trump replaces him with a Justice Antonin Scalia-like
conservative who, believing that gerrymanders are nonjudiciable,
joins in 2022 with four other Republican appointees (Justices
Clarence Thomas, John Roberts, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch)
to overrule the 2018 Justice Kennedy-led decision that struck the
gerrymander down.
Justice Kennedy knows well the raw power to overrule a recent
precedent solely because one member of the Court has been replaced
with another. Justice Kennedy, after all, wrote the opinion in Citi-
zens United v. FEC,11 which overruled the seven-year-old McConnell
v. FEC,12 solely because Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who had
16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
8. Rick Hasen colorfully describes this as a “beauty pageant” in which jurisprudential
contestants parade themselves before Justice Kennedy in the hope that he will select one,
rather than none, as worthy. Hasen, supra note 2.
9. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
10. There is little doubt that the four Democratic appointees to the Court (Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan) would quickly join a
Justice Kennedy opinion finding an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander in the Wisconsin
case—especially given their recorded votes to deny the stay that the Court granted in Gill.
Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) (No. 16-1161) (order granting stay). The more uncer-
tain, but delicate, issue is whether any of the four Democratic appointees on the Court—either
Justices Ginsburg or Breyer, most probably—would, for health reasons, be unable to remain
on the Court until Gill is ultimately decided. Justice Ginsburg publicly assured audiences that
she is doing all she can to remain fit and is urging her colleagues, including Justice Kennedy,
to do the same. Ariane de Vogue, Ginsburg Talks Partisan Rancor, Electoral College and Kale,
CNN (Feb. 7, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/07/politics/ruth-bader-ginsburg-electoral-
college/index.html [https://perma.cc/E2GT-3DHD].
11. 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
12. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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supplied the crucial fifth vote in McConnell, stepped down in 2006
and was replaced by the more conservative Justice Alito.13 Even if
Justice Kennedy supplies the crucial fifth vote to invalidate a
gerrymander in 2018, he must be well aware that he can do nothing
to prevent his replacement from exercising the pure judicial power
to overrule that decision in exactly the same way that the addition
of Justice Alito to the Court gave him the power to jettison
McConnell.14
Despite this raw power of five Justices to overrule any precedent
they wish to discard, not all precedents are equally vulnerable to
overruling. Some decisions, even if 5-4 and sharply divisive when
rendered, gather a staying power over time and thus resist an effort
to undo them. For example, Miranda v. Arizona, the Warren Court
case that established the now-famous Miranda warnings,15 was 5-4
and extremely controversial, with many conservatives wishing for
decades to eradicate it.16 But when the question whether to overrule
it actually came before the much more conservative Rehnquist
Court in Dickerson v. United States,17 the Justices upheld it by a
vote of 7-2,18 with the archconservative Chief Justice William Rehn-
quist himself writing the opinion for the majority (which included
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, both President Reagan appoint-
ees).19 Miranda, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, had “become
part of our national culture.”20 He and his fellow conservatives on
the Court were unwilling to unravel the fabric of the nation by
attempting to tear Miranda from it.21
13. See Jeff Clements, Justice in the Balance: Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, AM. CONST. SOC’Y: ACS BLOG (June 16, 2016), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/
justice-in-the-balance-citizens-united-v-federal-election-commission?page=1# [https://perma.
cc/3GW8-LVV3]; David Stout, Alito Is Sworn in as Justice After 58-42 Vote to Confirm Him,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/31/politics/politicsspecial1/alito-
is-sworn-in-as-justice-after-5842-vote-to.html [https://perma.cc/YED3-9U8R].
14. See Clements, supra note 13.
15. 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
16. See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspec-
tive on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1057-58 (1998).
17. 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
18. Id. at 430.
19. Id. at 431.
20. Id. at 443.
21. See id.
2018] THE GERRYMANDER AND THE CONSTITUTION 1735
The key point, then, is that the Court’s precedents are capable of
gathering a cultural force that immunizes them from subsequent
overruling even by newly appointed Justices who are ideologically
opposed to them. The Second Amendment decision, District of
Columbia v. Heller, likely has this character.22 Although also a 5-4
decision23 and extremely controversial,24 it is doubtful that it would
have been overruled even if Hillary Clinton had won the presidency
and Merrick Garland, or another Democratic appointee, had re-
placed Justice Scalia. Like Miranda,25 Heller has become ingrained
in the national culture, and it would have been too disruptive and
counterproductive for liberals, despite despising it, to get rid of it.26 
Justice Kennedy clearly hopes that something similar happens to
Obergefell v. Hodges, his opinion for a 5-4 Court that required all
fifty states to extend an equal right to marry to same-sex, as well as
opposite-sex, couples.27 If President Trump replaces Justice Ken-
nedy with a Scalia-like Justice, then in theory there would be a new
five-vote majority hostile to Obergefell. But notwithstanding the fact
that this new five-vote majority likely would not have recognized a
constitutional right to gay marriage if it had controlled the Court in
Obergefell itself, it does not automatically follow that this new five-
vote majority will pull the trigger to overrule Obergefell.28 On the
contrary, Justice Kennedy’s opinion embracing marriage equality is
quickly becoming interwoven into the national culture,29 and it is
22. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
23. Id. at 572.
24. See Alex Altman, The Future of Gun Control, TIME (June 26, 2008), http://content.time.
com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1818325,00.html [https://perma.cc/QHK7-2S4F] (discussing
Justice Steven’s Heller dissent).
25. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
26. See Adam Winkler, Why the Supreme Court Won’t Impact Gun Rights, ATLANTIC (June
7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/why-the-supreme-court-wont-
restrict-gun-rights/485810/ [https://perma.cc/VM8U-VPW3] (“Plus, there is one really strong
reason not to overturn Heller: It would spark a backlash that would make the political move-
ment to reverse Roe seem like a schoolyard kerfuffle.... The justices know this—as do gun-
control advocates. Several of the latter have told me they would not ask the Court to overturn
Heller, even if a liberal is appointed to fill Scalia’s seat.”); see also Allen Rostron, The Past and
Future Role of the Second Amendment and Gun Control in Fights over Confirmation of
Supreme Court Nominees, 3 NE. U. L.J. 123, 173 (2011) (predicting that Heller “will never be
expressly overruled”).
27. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591, 2604-05 (2015).
28. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
29. See Ruth Marcus, If You’re Reading This, Justice Kennedy, Please Don’t Retire, WASH.
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unlikely that even conservatives ideologically opposed to it will see
overruling it as a worthwhile expenditure of judicial capital.30 
So, clearly, some precedents acquire this kind of staying power.31
But, just as clearly, not all do.32 McConnell was unable to resist
being overruled in Citizens United.33 Thus, the crucial question for
any anti-gerrymandering precedent that Justice Kennedy might
render before retiring is whether—like Dickerson, Heller, and per-
haps Obergefell—it also could be capable of gaining the necessary
staying power.
To consider this crucial question, it is necessary to analyze not
only what arguments might convince Justice Kennedy in the first
instance to support an anti-gerrymandering majority opinion, but
more importantly, what arguments down the road might potentially
convince hostile Justices—like Justices Roberts, Alito, Gorsuch, or
whoever replaces Justice Kennedy himself—to refrain from
overruling that anti-gerrymandering precedent. In thinking along
these lines, one must ask what attributes of an anti-gerrymandering
precedent might enable it to generate the cultural status that helps
make it resistant to subsequent repudiation. To conduct this in-
quiry, in turn, it becomes necessary to contemplate more broadly the
nature of constitutional rights and their role in national culture.
POST (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/if-youre-reading-this-justice-
kennedy-please-dont-retire/2017/02/03/d3a039e6-ea3e-11e6-bf6f-301b6b443624_story.html
[https://perma.cc/AXW8-N6TC] (suggesting, and hoping, that Obergefell and other gay rights
precedents authored by Justice Kennedy “are already so woven into the social fabric that a
future court, a court without a Kennedy to protect his precedents and their underlying
rationale, will be reluctant to unwind them”).
30. See Carl Eric Scott, The Post-Obergefell Political Trap, NAT’L REV. (July 3, 2015, 7:16
PM), http: //www.nationalreview.com/postmodern-conservative /420740/post-obergefell-
political-trap-carl-eric-scott [https://perma.cc/AX2S-F45U].
31. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
33. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
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I. UNIVERSALISM AND PARTICULARISM IN THE EXPOSITION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS34
In the Court’s jurisprudence, some constitutional rights aspire to
be universal human rights. In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy depicted
the right to gay marriage this way.35 As he described it, the right to
have a soulmate, regardless of one’s sexual orientation, inheres in
being human.36 “Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lone-
ly person might call out only to find no one there,”37 Justice Kennedy
wrote for the Court.
Not all constitutional rights, however, are universalistic in na-
ture. The right recognized in Heller surely is not.38 Other civilized
nations have strict limits on gun ownership, and a personal right to
possess a handgun would be inconsistent with the laws, including
constitutional law, of those societies.39
The reasoning in Heller, too, had no pretense to universalism. On
the contrary, its recognition of the handgun right was rooted in the
distinctive circumstances of American history and social customs.40
Inevitably recognizing that the authors of the Second Amendment
34. Other authors have articulated the dichotomy between universalism and particu-
larism in constitutional interpretation and the identification of constitutional rights. See, e.g.,
Mark Tushnet, The Universal and the Particular in Constitutional Law: An Israeli Case
Study, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1327, 1337-40 (2000) (book review). My use of this dichotomy
emphasizes the methodological distinction in the judicial reasoning used to delineate the
contours of generally worded constitutional clauses. Universalistic reasoning seeks to define
these clauses through the invocation of overarching general principles, usually derived from
abstract philosophical ideas. Particularistic reasoning, conversely, seeks to specify the mean-
ing of these clauses by anchoring them in concrete instances of America’s national experience,
with a preference for those experiences most deeply rooted in American history, and thus
mostly likely to be most deeply ingrained in America’s collective national character.
35. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599-2601 (2015).
36. See id. at 2599.
37. Id. at 2600.
38. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-29 (2008).
39. Jonathan Masters, U.S. Gun Policy: Global Comparisons, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-gun-policy-global-comparisons [https://
perma.cc/8A7C-8TPM]; see also Juliette Jowit et al., So, America, This Is How Other Countries
Do Gun Control, GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2016, 4:57 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2016/mar/15/so-america-this-is-how-you-do-gun-control [https://perma.cc/L6XT-Y8J4].
40. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Heller is an exegesis
on the history of gun rights in America, including “how the Second Amendment was inter-
preted from immediately after its ratification through the end of the 19th century.” Id. at 605.
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could not have envisioned the kind of firepower capable of handgun
technology today, the Heller Court ruled that the constitutional
right to possess a gun is limited to whatever types of gun happen to
be “in common use” at the current moment.41 This limitation per-
mits the government to ban fully automatic weapons because, being
especially “dangerous and unusual,” they are not widespread.42
Some constitutional rights are mixed, or hybrid, insofar as they
have some dimensions that seem universalistic, while in other re-
spects seem particularistic. The freedom of speech is an example.43
The basic right to express an opinion on an issue of public concern
transcends the particular circumstances of American history and
culture and, instead, is essential in any society that purports to re-
spect basic human dignity.44 Other aspects of First Amendment
jurisprudence, by contrast, are specifically rooted in the particular
circumstances of American historical and cultural experience. New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court’s pronouncement of constitu-
tional constraints upon a state’s libel laws,45 famously predicated its
holding on the observation that the Alien and Sedition Acts, while
initially enforced by federal judges, were deemed unconstitutional
“in the court of history.”46 Since Thomas Jefferson and James Madi-
son vehemently protested their adoption,47 the Alien and Sedition
Acts have been held up as precisely the kind of governmental effort
to muzzle dissent that the First Amendment is designed to protect
against.48
41. Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
42. See, e.g., id.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 35-36 (7th ed. 1871); Steven Pinker, Why
Free Speech Is Fundamental, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/
opinion/2015/01/26/why-free-speech-fundamental/aaAWVYFscrhFCC4ye9FVjN/story.html
[https://perma.cc/SD5M-84R2]; see also Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 119, 152-53 (1989) (articulating, as one important justification for free speech,
“the idea that ... [a]s a matter of basic human respect we may owe it to each other to listen to
what each of us has to say, or at least not to foreclose the opportunity to speak and to listen”).
45. 376 U.S. 254, 267-68, 283-84 (1964).
46. Id. at 276; see also Edward B. Foley, Wechsler, History, and Gerrymandering,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-wechsler-
history-gerrymandering/ [https://perma.cc/YY5N-ZZ59] (explaining how the Court relied upon
Herbert Weschler’s brief for this crucial point).
47. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 274-75.
48. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural
Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 318 & n.88 (1986) (describing how the Court “got it right” in New
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Similarly, the special First Amendment prohibition against prior
restraints is not a principle derivable from pure political theory.49
Rather, it stems from the historical concern with laws attempting
to license the press.50 So, too, with the categorical exception of ob-
scenity from First Amendment protections.51 A purely theoreti-
cal—and universalistic—conception of free expression would have
difficulty articulating the basis for excluding sexually explicit
speech from the scope of the protected freedom.52 But a First
Amendment jurisprudence that is rooted, at least in part, in the
particular circumstances of American history and social customs can
formulate a rationale for keeping “prurient” speech off-limits.53
Indeed, the Court’s test for determining obscenity is itself inherently
particularistic insofar as an essential element of the test is that
prurience must be evaluated according to “contemporary community
standards.”54
York Times Co. v. Sullivan when it embraced the historical repudiation of the Alien and Sedi-
tion Acts); Jed Rubenfeld, The Paradigm-Case Method, 115 YALE L.J. 1977, 1983 n.16 (2006)
(explaining how Sullivan, by relying upon the historical repudiation of the Alien and Sedition
Acts, is a canonical example of how “historical Application Understandings can become
foundational even if not so held at the time of the founding”); see also ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE
NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 65 (1991).
49. See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 437
(1983) (arguing on theoretical grounds for dispensing with the doctrine of prior restraint, for
it “no longer warrants use as an independent category of First Amendment analysis”).
50. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The
Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 693 (1988) (defending
the doctrine of prior restraint, despite its theoretical weaknesses, because of its particular role
in the development of America’s free speech tradition).
51. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
52. Arnold H. Loewy, Obscenity, Pornography, and First Amendment Theory, 2 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 471, 472-73, 475 (1993).
53. Derigan Silver & Dan V. Kozlowski, The First Amendment Originalism of Justices
Brennan, Scalia and Thomas, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 385, 398, 415 (2012) (explaining that
Justice William Brennan used an originalist methodology in Roth to conclude that the First
Amendment did not protect obscenity). Justice Scalia, consistent with his generally originalist
approach to constitutional interpretation, understood the exclusion of obscenity from First
Amendment protection on purely historical, rather than theoretical, grounds. See John A.
Humbach, ‘Sexting’ and the First Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433, 441 n.43 (2010)
(citing Scalia’s opinion in Heller, among other authorities, on this point).
54. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
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A. The Weakness of Universalism with Respect to Partisan
Gerrymanders
The effort to use the Equal Protection Clause to constrain legis-
lative districting has been framed mostly as a matter of complying
with universalistic demands of democracy. The foundational
principle of “one person, one vote,” articulated in Reynolds v. Sims55
to insist that states apportion their legislative districts so that they
all are roughly equal in population,56 was so conceived. The Rey-
nolds Court justified its insistence on “one person, one vote” as
essentially emanating arithmetically from the very definition of
democracy: “It would appear extraordinary to suggest that a State
could be constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that
certain of the State’s voters could vote two, five, or 10 times for their
legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could vote
only once.”57 Therefore, the Court reasoned, it would be equally
untenable “that the votes of citizens in one part of the State should
be given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight of votes of
citizens in another part of the State.”58
Building upon the success of the equal protection claim in Rey-
nolds, the challenge to partisan gerrymandering of districts that
comply with “one person, one vote” has been framed in similarly
universalistic terms. Whether conceived of as the right of each voter
to have an equal opportunity to be part of a winning coalition
without improper bias on the part of the legislative mapmaker,59 or
alternatively the equal right of each political party to compete for
votes without improper bias built into the legislative map,60 the
underlying idea is that partisan gerrymandering is inconsistent
with the basic principle of equal representation for all citizens
inherent in the very concept of democracy itself.61 If the Equal
55. 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
56. Id. at 568.
57. Id. at 562.
58. Id.
59. See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV.
253, 267 (2006).
60. See Richard Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymand-
ering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 413-14 (2005).
61. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593,
606 (2002).
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entails this basic
principle of electoral equality, as Reynolds insisted,62 then it ought
to be possible to derive a constitutional prohibition against partisan
gerrymandering from the Equal Protection Clause.
The logic is a simple syllogism. The major premise is that equal
protection encompasses electoral equality. The minor premise is
that partisan gerrymandering contravenes electoral equality. Ergo:
partisan gerrymandering contravenes equal protection.
The new “efficiency gap” metric,63 which is at the heart of the
challenge to Wisconsin’s map in Gill64—and thus now squarely
before the Supreme Court65—rests on this kind of universalistic
reasoning. The “efficiency gap” measures each party’s number of
wasted votes, which are calculated by combining (1) all the votes
cast for the party’s candidates in legislative districts that the party
did not win and (2) all the extra votes, beyond the bare minimum
necessary for victory, cast for the party’s candidates in those dis-
tricts that the party did win.66 The gap is the difference between
each party’s number of wasted votes.67
The premise of the “efficiency gap” as an appropriate measure for
evaluating a state’s compliance with the constitutional requirement
of electoral equality is that a legislative map should have no built-in
bias in favor of one political party, and thus ideally the average “ef-
ficiency gap” over the ten-year duration of the map should be zero
(or thereabouts).68 A hypothetical map in which each legislative
district is exceptionally competitive, producing 51-49 wins in every
election, might oscillate sharply with large “efficiency gaps” in favor
of one party in some years, followed by large “efficiency gaps” in
favor of the other party in other years.69 After all, a 51-49 district
62. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565.
63. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 851-52.
64. See Complaint at ¶¶ 5-7, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-
judge court), argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
65. See Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) (No. 16-1161) (order granting stay).
66. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 851.
67. Id. at 851-52.
68. The plaintiffs in Gill acknowledged that, as a practical matter, it would be necessary
to set a threshold for determining how much deviation from the ideal would render a map
unconstitutional, just as it is necessary to set a threshold for deviations from one person, one
vote.
69. The developers of the efficiency gap themselves recognize the potential volatility
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causes one party to waste 49 percent of the total votes in that
district, while the other party wastes only 1 percent of the total
votes, for a gap of 48.70 In principle, however, these large-but-oscil-
lating “efficiency gaps” would average out to zero over time (and
across districts), since if the districts are truly competitive in that
each party has an equal chance to prevail in them in each election,
then presumably each party will receive its roughly equal share of
51-49 wins.
It is easy to imagine a map that is consistently biased in favor of
one political party and thus routinely produces an efficiency gap to
that party’s advantage. Imagine, for example, that a state has a ten-
district map, with each district having 1,000,000 voters. Assume
that the state is consistently a 50-50 state overall, but that the
districts are drawn so that Party A always wins eight of them 55-45,
while Party B always wins only two of them 70-30:
District Party A Party B
1 550,000 450,000
2 550,000 450,000
3 550,000 450,000
4 550,000 450,000
5 550,000 450,000
6 550,000 450,000
7 550,000 450,000
8 550,000 450,000
9 300,000 700,000
10 300,000 700,000
These results produce an efficiency gap of 30 percent, calculated as
follows.71 In Districts 1-8, Party B wastes all of its 450,000 votes in
each district,72 for a subtotal of 3,600,000 wasted votes. By contrast,
Party A wastes only 50,000 (minus 1, but ignore for rounding
inherent in the metric. Id. at 889. This volatility was a source of significant concern for the
dissenting district court judge in Gill. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 959-60 (Griesbach, J.,
dissenting).
70. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 4, at 851-52.
71. See id. at 850-52 (describing how to perform an efficiency gap calculation).
72. See id. at 850-51.
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purposes) votes in each district,73 for a subtotal of 400,000. In
Districts 9 and 10, Party A wastes all of its 300,000 votes in each,74
for a subtotal of 600,000. In these two districts, Party B wastes
200,000 votes (minus 1, but again ignore) in each,75 for a subtotal of
400,000. Party A’s total number of wasted votes is 1,000,000,
whereas Party B ’s total number of wasted votes is a staggering
4,000,000—four times as many as Party A. Expressed as a percent-
age of the 10,000,000 votes in the state overall, the efficiency gap of
3,000,000 votes is 30 percent.76 If an efficiency gap of that magni-
tude favoring Party A is durable election after election, this number
is a strong indication of the considerable extent to which the map
has a built-in advantage for Party A.77
Other newly proposed mathematical measures of partisan bias in
redistricting are similarly universalistic insofar as they start with
the premise that a particular form of equality is ideal and that any
significant deviation from this equality demonstrates the map’s
built-in bias. For example, the “mean-median difference” compares
a party’s average vote share across all districts with the party’s vote
share in the median district (which is the district in the middle of all
districts arrayed from largest to smallest in terms of the party’s vote
share in each district).78 Ideally, a party’s mean and median vote
shares should be the same.79 When they are, a party’s percentage of
votes in the state as a whole matches the party’s percentage of votes
in the tipping-point district, the district that gives one party or the
other the majority of seats elected using this map.80
A party, of course, should have no guarantee of winning a majori-
ty of seats. But a map that is evenly balanced between two parties
will tend to give each party an equal chance of winning the tipping-
73. See id. at 851.
74. See id. at 850-51.
75. See id. at 851.
76. See id. at 851-52.
77. See id. at 854.
78. See Michael D. McDonald & Robin E. Best, Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics
and Law: A Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases, 14 ELECTION L.J. 312, 316 (2015) (advocating use
of the mean-median metric); see also Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation
of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1263, 1304-07 (2016) (proposing the mean-
median test as the basis for one of several metrics to detect partisan gerrymanders).
79. See McDonald & Best, supra note 78, at 316.
80. See id.
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point district as each party’s share of the total votes cast in the state
approaches 50-50.81 Thus, if Party A wins 52 percent of votes state-
wide, it will also win 52 percent of the votes in the median district
if the map is ideally balanced this way and hence the mean-median
difference is zero.82
Conversely, a map is skewed, or biased, against a party insofar as
the party’s average vote share exceeds its vote share in the median,
or tipping-point, district.83 Suppose, again, that Party A wins 52 per-
cent of votes statewide, but this time its vote share in the median
district is only 48 percent. This discrepancy signifies that some of
Party A’s extra votes have been “packed” into the relatively few
districts (below the median) in which Party A did especially well.84
The map is biased against Party A in this respect.85 (In the ten-
district example above to illustrate the efficiency gap, Party B’s
average vote share is 50 percent, but its median vote share is only
45 percent, thereby indicating the degree to which the map is
skewed against Party B.)
While mathematical measures like the “efficiency gap” and the
“mean-median difference” have the virtue of being theoretically pris-
tine and precise, they suffer from an unavoidable vulnerability. The
Constitution, as Justice Kennedy has patiently explained, does not
require legislative maps to be evenly balanced, or anything close to
it, with respect to the ability of political parties and their voters to
translate votes cast for a party’s candidates into seats won by the
party’s candidates.86 The sociological clumping of Democrats in cit-
ies, with the corresponding dispersal of Republicans in rural and
exurban areas, puts Democrats at an inherent disadvantage in any
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 317.
84. See id. at 317-18.
85. See id. at 318.
86. In Vieth, Justice Kennedy observed: “There is no authority for” the proposition that
“a majority of voters in the Commonwealth should be able to elect a majority of the Common-
wealth’s congressional delegation.” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 308 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment). He also observed: “[I]f we were to demand that congressional dis-
tricts take a particular shape, we could not assure the parties that this criterion, neutral
enough on its face, would not in fact benefit one political party over another.” Id. at 309. In
LULAC, furthermore, Justice Kennedy emphasized: “[T]here is no constitutional requirement
of proportional representation.” LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419 (2006) (Kennedy, J.).
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legislative map drawn according to conventional geographical
considerations, like the compactness of a district’s shape or conform-
ing district lines insofar as possible to the existing boundaries of
cities, counties, and other local units of government.87
This point is true whether one uses the “efficiency gap” or the
“mean-median difference” or any other mathematical measure de-
signed to evaluate the extent to which a map treats parties and
their voters equally. Democrats packed tightly into urban districts
will tend to waste more votes than their more efficiently distributed
Republican counterparts. Similarly, by winning especially big in the
major metropolitan areas, Democrats can run up the score in terms
of their average vote share without improving at all their vote share
in the tipping-point district. Indeed, something like this happened
in the 2016 presidential election, with Hillary Clinton accentuating
the blueness of already blue California,88 but failing to win more
votes than Donald Trump in the battleground states that deter-
mined which candidate crossed the Electoral College tipping point.89
Simply put, the Constitution permits a legislative map putting
Democrats at this inherent disadvantage when the map is merely
reflecting existing geographical realities.
The straightforward syllogism thus has a flaw. Its major premise
is sound: the Equal Protection Clause does encompass a principle of
electoral equality. Its doing so is what yields the doctrine of “one
87. Justice Kennedy explicitly recognized this specific point: “[C]ompactness standards
help Republicans because Democrats are more likely to live in high density regions.” Vieth,
541 U.S. at 309 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Micah Altman, Modeling the
Effect of Mandatory District Compactness on Partisan Gerrymanders, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY
989, 1000-06 (1998)); see also Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerryman-
dering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 247, 262
(2013) (discussing the compactness of Democratic voters in towns in Florida that are often
subsumed into predominately rural and Republican districts); Nicholas Goedert, Gerry-
mandering or Geography? How Democrats Won the Popular Vote but Lost the Congress in
2012, 1 RES. & POL. 1, 1-2 (2014) (suggesting that the issue for Democrats “is not gerryman-
dering, but districting itself ”).
88. Clinton won 61.7 pecent of the vote in California, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF
VOTE: NOVEMBER 8, 2016, GENERAL ELECTION 6 (2016), whereas Obama won less, 60.2
percent, in 2012, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 6, 2012, GENERAL
ELECTION 7 (2012).
89. Nate Silver, Donald Trump Had a Superior Electoral College Strategy, FIVETHIRTY
EIGHT (Feb. 6, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/donald-trump-had-a-superior-
electoral-college-strategy/ [https://perma.cc/4E5G-ALEL].
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person, one vote,” which remains good law.90 But it turns out that
the syllogism’s minor premise is faulty. The principle of consti-
tutionally protected electoral equality does not require equal
treatment of political parties and their voters that insists upon leg-
islative maps that are evenly balanced between parties. The consti-
tutionally protected principle of electoral equality is more limited:
it produces the mathematical formula of “one person, one vote” to
guarantee that each citizen’s vote counts the same in legislative
representation, but it does not entail an equivalent mathematical
formula for producing maps equally favorable to the competing
political parties.
Given this truth, defenders of mathematical methods for testing
partisan imbalance in a legislative map have endeavored to develop
subsidiary tools designed to distinguish between imbalances caused
by valid geographical factors, on the one hand, and those caused by
improper partisanship on the other. One such strategy is to employ
the ever-increasing power of computers to generate myriads of maps
consistent with valid geographical factors, but excluding any overt
consideration of partisanship, and then see if the actual legislative
maps fall within the array of the computer-generated maps.91 If the
legislative map does not fall within the array of the computer-gener-
ated maps, then it is an outlier, and presumably partisanship rather
than geography is what explains the actual legislative map.92
A challenge for this strategy is that some degree of partisanship,
even beyond considerations of geography, is constitutionally permis-
sible—at least according to long-standing Supreme Court precedent
and most of its Justices, including Justice Kennedy.93 To be sure,
90. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558, 568 (1964).
91. See, e.g., Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Cutting Through the Thicket: Redistricting
Simulations and the Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders, 14 ELECTION L.J. 331, 332 (2015);
Jowei Chen & David Cottrell, Evaluating Partisan Gains from Congressional Gerryman-
dering: Using Computer Simulations to Estimate the Effect of Gerrymandering in the U.S.
House, 44 ELECTORAL STUD. 329, 331-32 (2016); see also Bruce E. Cain et al., A Reasonable
Bias Approach to Gerrymandering: Using Automated Plan Generation to Evaluate Redis-
tricting Proposals, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1521 (2018) (utilizing a supercomputer algorithm
as a method for determining unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering).
92. Chen & Cottrell, supra note 91, at 332.
93. Justice Kennedy expressed the point this way in his Vieth concurrence:
A determination that a gerrymander violates the law must rest on something
more than the conclusion that political classifications were applied. It must rest
instead on a conclusion that the classifications, though generally permissible,
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Justice John Paul Stevens famously argued that any consideration
of partisan advantage beyond what geography afforded should be
off-limits in drawing legislative maps.94 But the rest of the Justices
were unwilling to go so far. They recognized that historically the
task of drawing legislative maps had been entrusted to the legisla-
tures themselves and thus the practice inevitably would be infused
with partisanship.95 It could not be reasonably expected that par-
tisan politicians in control of the redistricting process, in choosing
among alternative maps that are all somewhat attentive to
were applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate
legislative objective.
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Kennedy added: the mere fact “that the legislature adopted political classifications” in its
redistricting “describes no constitutional flaw.” Id. at 313.
Justice Scalia’s plurality in Vieth put the point even more bluntly: “The Constitution clearly
contemplates districting by political entities, see Article I, § 4, and unsurprisingly that turns
out to be root-and-branch a matter of politics.” Id. at 285 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 286
(“[P]artisan districting is a lawful and common practice.”).
94. As Justice Stevens put it in his LULAC dissent, “[a] purely partisan desire” to mini-
mize the power of those opposing a political party does not qualify as a “legitimate govern-
mental purpose” under Fourteenth Amendment analysis. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 448
(2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens elaborated:
The requirements of the Federal Constitution that limit the State’s power to rely
exclusively on partisan preferences in drawing district lines are the Fourteenth
Amendment’s prohibition against invidious discrimination, and the First
Amendment’s protection of citizens from official retaliation based on their polit-
ical affiliation. The equal protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires actions taken by the sovereign to be supported by some legitimate
interest, and further establishes that a bare desire to harm a politically
disfavored group is not a legitimate interest. Similarly, the freedom of political
belief and association guaranteed by the First Amendment prevents the State,
absent a compelling interest, from ‘penalizing citizens because of their partici-
pation in the electoral process, ... their association with a political party, or their
expression of political views.’ These protections embodied in the First and
Fourteenth Amendments reflect the fundamental duty of the sovereign to govern
impartially.
Id. at 461-62 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).
95. In his Vieth dissent for himself and Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter candidly acknow-
ledged: “[S]ome intent to gain political advantage is inescapable whenever political bodies
devise a district plan, and some effect results from the intent.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 344 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, in turn, quoted this language to support the proposition that
the judicial line-drawing challenge was to distinguish the point at which there is too much
partisanship to be constitutionally permissible—or, as Justice Scalia colorfully described it,
“the difficult position of drawing the line between good politics and bad politics.” Id. at 298-99
(plurality opinion).
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geographical considerations, would not also inject an extra dose of
partisanship in drawing boundaries in order to give their party a bit
of a boost.96 The challenge was figuring out when this extra boost of
partisan advantage went too far and was excessive.97 As Justice Ken-
nedy put it in the conclusion to his Vieth concurrence: “The ordered
working of our Republic, and of the democratic process, depends on
a sense of decorum and restraint in all branches of government, and
in the citizenry itself. Here, one has the sense that legislative
restraint was abandoned.”98
The judiciary needed a tool for detecting when the partisans in
charge of the redistricting process had crossed the line and aban-
doned that necessary decency and self-restraint in the exercise of
their mapmaking power.
The difficulty, however, is that there is no easy measure of
excessiveness. One can run all the computer simulations that one
wants. But unless one can tell the computer how much partisanship
as a factor beyond geography is too much partisanship, the com-
puter will not be able to distinguish permissible from impermissible
partisanship. It is easy to measure deviations from an absolute, like
a zero “efficiency gap” or a zero “mean-median difference,” but if
some partisanship beyond geography is okay, how does one tell the
computer to identify when a mapmaker has exceeded the undefined
permissible limit of partisanship? No mathematical test, as Justice
Scalia observed in the Vieth plurality, “can possibly be successful
unless one knows what he is testing for”99—the inescapable need
being to answer the pre-mathematical question, “How much polit-
ical motivation and effect is too much?”100
96. See id. at 286 (plurality opinion).
97. In his Vieth plurality, Justice Scalia made clear that he agreed with the dissenters
(and Justice Kennedy) that “an excessive injection of politics is unlawful,” but he also asserted
that the converse was equally true: “[S]etting out to segregate [voters] by political affiliation
is (so long as one doesn’t go too far) lawful and hence ordinary.” Id. at 293.
98. Id. at 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
99. Id. at 296-97 (plurality opinion).
100. Since this Symposium has been held and this Article written, the briefs filed in the
Supreme Court in Gill have elucidated the way in which computer simulations can be used
to distinguish excessive from permissible degrees of partisanship. See Edward B. Foley, The
Missing Link in Gerrymandering Jurisprudence, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (Sept. 12, 2017,
4:35 PM), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election-law/article/?article=13409 [https://perma.cc/3H9Z-
8L7P]. In future work, I plan to analyze how this innovative use of computer simulations
relates to the kind of particularistic reasoning I discuss in this Article. See also Edward B.
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B. Particularism and Gerrymandering
The difficulties in developing a mathematical test for identifying
excessive partisanship in the drawing of a legislative map, while
obviously serious, should not cause Justice Kennedy—or his future
replacement on the Court—to abandon the effort to formulate a
judicially manageable standard for detecting impermissibly partisan
gerrymanders. What should be jettisoned, instead, is the insistence
upon the exclusive validity of a universalistic measure of unconstitu-
tional gerrymandering, one derived from the essential nature of the
redistricting enterprise. Instead, the quest for a constitutional stan-
dard for condemning excessively partisan redistricting should em-
brace the search for a particularistic metric of excessively partisan
redistricting, one rooted in the distinctively American experience of
the iconic gerrymander.101
The term “gerrymander” is used so frequently to refer to the
generic practice of manipulating district lines to secure a partisan
advantage that it is easy to forget, if only momentarily, that the
term originates from one specific instance of such manipulation.102
“Gerrymander,” or “Gerry-mander” as it was first written, is the pe-
jorative label attached to the salamander-shaped district approved
by Governor Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts in 1812.103 The shape
of the district was so grotesque that the inappropriate partisanship
in drawing its boundaries was evident immediately from looking at
the map.
Foley, Of X-Rays, CT Scans, and Gerrymanders, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (Oct. 3, 2017, 6:32
PM), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election-law/article/?article=13415 [https://perma.cc/83MN-
K844].
101. See generally The Gerry-Mander, BOS. GAZETTE, Mar. 26, 1812, at 2.
102. See id.
103. Id.
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Figure 1. The Original Gerrymander
It is possible to take this original gerrymander as not merely an
illustration of improper redistricting, but indeed the very definition
of improper redistricting—at least in the American context.104 After
all, by giving its name to the general category of legislative maps
tainted by excessive partisanship, the original gerrymander itself
104. I explore this point in my article, Edward B. Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and
Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle for Judicial Review of Election Laws, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 655, 711-12 (2017).
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delineates the point at which partisanship in the drawing of legis-
lative districts becomes inappropriately excessive.105 To be sure, not
all newly gerrymandered maps look exactly like the original sala-
mander-shaped district that provoked the contemptuous epithet.
But in common parlance all newly gerrymandered districts are
disfigured to the same degree as the original gerrymander, such
that one can tell just as easily from merely looking at the map that
something went horribly wrong in the drawing of it.106 For example,
a recent PBS explanation of Gerrymandering, or How Drawing
Irregular Lines Can Impact an Election began with the origin of the
term in Gerry’s “salamander-shaped electoral district that benefited
his party” and then illustrated the contemporary form of the prac-
tice with Maryland’s especially egregious Third Congressional dis-
trict, known as the “praying mantis.”107 A particularistic conception
of unconstitutional gerrymandering would thus take the original
gerrymander itself as the touchstone and judge invalid, at least
presumptively, any equally disfigured district.108
105. See id. at 712-13.
106. See id. at 713.
107. Gerrymandering, or How Drawing Irregular Lines Can Impact an Election, PBS:
NEWSHOUR EXTRA (June 20, 2017), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/2017/06/gerrymander
ing-or-how-drawing-irregular-lines-can-impact-an-election/ [https://perma.cc/7CJ2-GE3D]; see
infra Figure 2.
108. See Foley, supra note 104, at 720-21.
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Figure 2. Maryland’s Current Third Congressional District (“The
Praying Mantis”)109
It is possible to measure any newly drawn district to determine
whether or not its boundaries are distorted to the same extent as
the original gerrymander.110 It is a simple calculation—as easy as
comparing the perimeter of the original gerrymander to the pe-
rimeter of a circle with the same area (because a circle is the most
undistorted shape possible, the degree to which a district deviates
from a same-sized circle is a measure of the district’s distortedness),
and then doing the exact same comparison for any other district.111
109. Christopher Ingraham, America’s Most Gerrymandered Congressional Districts, WASH.
POST (May 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/05/15/americas-
most-gerrymandered-congressional-districts/?utm_term=.487530d2848c [https://perma.cc/
S2F4-42Y2].
110. Stephen Ansolabehere & Maxwell Palmer, A Two-Hundred Year Statistical History
of the Gerrymander, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 741, 742-44 (2016).
111. Id. at 747. Comparing the perimeter of the district to the perimeter of a circle with the
same area is called the Schwartzberg measurement, after the author who first proposed it.
See H.P. Young, Measuring the Compactness of Legislative Districts, 13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 105,
108-09 (1988) (describing the Schwartberg measurement). A mathematically equivalent
measurement, known as Polsby-Popper, compares the area of the district with the area of a
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If the new district’s perimeter-compared-to-circle score equals or
exceeds the original gerrymander’s perimeter-compared-to-circle
score, then the new district is just as gerrymandered as its original
namesake (or at least presumptively so).112
It would be judicially manageable to set the constitutional stan-
dard for identifying excessively partisan redistricting by using the
original gerrymander as the baseline in this way.113 Any district
with a perimeter-compared-to-circle score as bad as, or worse than,
the original gerrymander’s score would be presumptively unconsti-
tutional.114 As with any other type of constitutional test, the gov-
ernment would be given the opportunity to defend its apparently
unconstitutional practice as actually necessary to achieve the gov-
ernment’s proper objectives.115 Thus, despite a district measuring as
distorted as the original gerrymander, or even more so, the govern-
ment would have a chance to justify the district on the ground that
its distorted shape really was necessary to accomplish valid
geographical goals.116 But the government could not justify a
distorted district as egregious as the original gerrymander on the
ground that it was endeavoring to achieve an acceptable level of
circle with the same perimeter. See Ansolabehere & Palmer, supra note 110, at 747 & n.45.
Since the two metrics are interchangeable, I focus on the Schwartzberg measurement because
it seems more intuitively related to the distorting nature of a gerrymandered district: How
much bigger is the perimeter of a district than it needs to be, in relation to the area of the
district, as a result of manipulating the district’s boundaries to achieve political purposes
unrelated to the basic geography of the district? Schwartzberg quantifies this degree of dis-
tortedness.
The Washington Post has published Polsby-Popper scores for every current congressional
district. Christopher Ingraham, How Gerrymandered Is Your Congressional District?, WASH.
POST (May 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/gerrymandering/
[https://perma.cc/PE6V-MTGQ]. Ansolabehere and Palmer have examined every congressional
district historically to see how they compare to the original gerrymander, although they do
not report all of their calculations in their published piece. See Ansolabehere & Palmer, supra
note 110, at 743. With the Washington Post data that is publicly available, it would be
possible to replicate their determination of which current congressional districts have a
Polsby-Popper, or Schwartzberg, score equal to or worse than the original gerrymander.
Maryland’s current Third Congressional District is clearly one of these, as Ansolabehere and
Palmer explicitly state. See id. at 758-59.
112. See Ansolabehere & Palmer, supra note 110, at 747.
113. For further discussion, see Foley, supra note 104, at 729.
114. See id.
115. See, e.g., id. at 722.
116. See id.
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partisanship in the design of the district.117 Partisanship to that ex-
tent would be constitutionally out-of-bounds, as determined by the
historically and specifically condemned excessiveness of the original
gerrymander itself.118
This particularistic approach to defining an unconstitutional
gerrymander uses a kind of mathematical test (the “perimeter-com-
pared-to-circle score” previously mentioned), but it is not an effort
at a universalistic measure of improperly partisan districting.119
This particularistic approach, it must be acknowledged, would leave
unreviewable—at least as a matter of judicially enforceable federal
constitutional law—any new district not as distorted as the original
gerrymander.120 Thus, there easily could be a newly drawn map in
which partisanship rather than geography accounts for the drawing
of particular district lines, but the resulting district boundaries are
not as disfigured as the original gerrymander. But that fact is
simply the consequence of pursuing a particularistic, rather than
universalistic, approach. There being no universalistic way to mea-
sure excessiveness in the degree to which the desire for partisan
advantage affected a district’s shape, the particularistic approach
sets the constitutional test for excessiveness in terms of the
historically and culturally identified measure of excessiveness: the
original gerrymander itself.121 This approach necessarily leaves
untouched the partisan manipulation of maps that fall short of the
original gerrymander’s egregiousness. But particularism makes up
for what it leaves uncovered by providing a precise way to
identify—and invalidate—at least those extreme instances of
partisan manipulation that rise to the same level as the original
gerrymander, the image that comes to Americans’ minds when they
condemn inappropriate districting as a gerrymander.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 725.
119. See generally id. at 720-24.
120. See id. at 727-28.
121. See generally id.
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C. Tying a Particularistic Attack on Gerrymandering to Specific
Constitutional Clauses
The fact that particularism provides a judicially manageable stan-
dard for invalidating excessively partisan maps, by itself, does not
end the constitutional analysis. This judicial manageability still
must be adequately linked to a constitutional clause, or doctrine, in
order to give the judiciary the warrant to undertake the manageable
inquiry. It might be manageable for the Court to insist that all
public schools spend the same amount of money to educate each
student, but the Court may not impose that standard—despite its
manageability—if it cannot be adequately linked to the Constitution
itself.122
There are at least three alternative bases for linking the condem-
nation of the original gerrymander to the text of the Constitution.
1. Due Process
Elsewhere, I have offered an explanation for why the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a proper basis for
invalidating gerrymanders as egregious as the original one.123 I will
not repeat that explanation here, except to provide a brief summary.
First, the Due Process Clause has long been interpreted by the Su-
preme Court, and properly so, to embody a basic principle of fair
play.124 Second, besides applying to the areas of civil procedure and
criminal law, where the Court has unanimously invoked it, this
principle of fair play also appropriately applies to legislation govern-
ing elections, where the parties are engaged in a form of competition
that deserves to be regulated by a norm of fair play.125 Third, the
history of America’s experience leading up to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment indicates that Americans widely viewed the
original gerrymander, along with similarly egregious legislative
maps, as a breach of this fair play norm.126 Putting these three
122. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973).
123. See Foley, supra note 104, at 710-20.
124. See id. at 711.
125. See id. at 725.
126. See id.
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points together yields the conclusion that districts as distorted as
the original gerrymander contravene due process, or at least they
presumptively do, and thus will be invalid unless defended as neces-
sary to achieve proper redistricting objectives.127 This logic, it must
be observed, is a type of syllogistic reasoning—but unlike the earlier
syllogism, it does not suffer from a flaw in one of its component
premises.
This due process reasoning, as sound as it is, is nonetheless only
one of several ways to tie the objection of the original gerrymander
to the provision of the Constitution.
2. First Amendment
As Justice Kennedy suggested in Vieth, the First Amendment
stands as a potential basis for invalidating partisan gerrymanders
insofar as the First Amendment generally prohibits advantaging or
disadvantaging individuals because of their political beliefs or
affiliations.128 The problem, however, with invoking the First
Amendment to invalidate partisan redistricting is that it, like the
Equal Protection Clause, has been unable to distinguish between
permissible and excessive degrees of partisanship in the drawing of
district lines.129 The attempts to develop a universalistic theory of
improper partisanship, derived from the nature of political freedom
itself, has foundered for the same kinds of reasons that universal-
ism has failed to extract a judicially manageable standard of
improper partisanship from solely the pure idea of political equal-
ity.130
Yet, as we have already observed, First Amendment analysis
need not be exclusively universalistic.131 On the contrary, First
Amendment jurisprudence historically has been particularistic,
127. See id. at 711.
128. In Justice Kennedy’s own words, “First Amendment concerns arise where a State
enacts a law that has the purpose and effect of subjecting a group of voters or their party to
disfavored treatment by reason of their views.” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
129. Briffault, supra note 60, at 408 (“[U]ltimately, the First Amendment argument fails.”).
130. Cf. Tokaji, supra note 6, at 2162-64 (arguing why expressive association should be
used to evaluate partisan gerrymandering claims).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
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certainly much more so than equal protection jurisprudence.132 The
Alien and Sedition Acts are identifiable as unconstitutional on
particularistic grounds quite apart from how their unconstitutional-
ity fits into an overall theory of free speech.133
The same type of analysis applies easily to the original gerryman-
der. It matters not how a pure theory of free expression would
handle the problem of excessive partisanship in redistricting.
Instead, all that matters is that the original gerrymander demar-
cates an injection of partisanship into the districting process that
unfairly—and improperly—favors one party over another because
of their differing political views.134 The First Amendment bans
government from differentiating among individuals based on their
political views, at least when doing so crosses the line into becoming
an impermissible form of such differentiation.135 The original gerry-
mander singles out one such form, regardless of where else the
constitutional dividing line may be drawn.136 Thus, the original ger-
rymander—and all other districts equally distorted or even more so,
which cannot be defended on nonpartisan geographical grounds—vi-
olate the First Amendment as improper discrimination on the basis
of partisanship. This fundamental point holds true whether or not
other forms of partisan discrimination, including other forms of
partisan redistricting, also violate the First Amendment.137
This mode of First Amendment analysis should suffice to demon-
strate the original gerrymander’s unconstitutionality as a First
Amendment proposition. But there is more. Just as First Amend-
ment jurisprudence defines obscenity by “contemporary community
standards,”138 so too does First Amendment jurisprudence identify
improper districting by reference to the continuing cultural status
of the original gerrymander. Both are examples of particularistic
132. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
133. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964).
134. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
135. See id.
136. See Foley, supra note 104, at 720.
137. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, Voting Is Association, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 766 (2016)
(arguing that “future litigants ... should ... [include] First Amendment association claims in
their arsenal”).
138. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
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reasoning within First Amendment jurisprudence.139 While reliance
on the original gerrymander may be somewhat more historically
rooted than the obscenity doctrine’s invocation of “contemporary
community standards,”140 it is only because of obscenity’s long-
standing historical exclusion from First Amendment protection that
there is a need to update that traditional exclusion with reference
to contemporary community standards.141 Likewise, precisely be-
cause gerrymandering remains—and always has been—as objection-
able in America’s cultural self-understanding as it was when first
denominated as such in the original “Gerry-mander,” it is necessary
to enforce a First Amendment prohibition on equivalently distorted
contemporaneous gerrymanders, whatever else may or may not be
prohibited by the First Amendment.
3. Judicial Underenforcement
There is, moreover, still another way to understand the relation-
ship of this particularistic reasoning to overall First Amendment
theory—a way that invokes the idea of “judicial underenforcement”
of constitutional norms.142 This idea is that judges, particularly fed-
eral judges subject to the jurisdictional limitations imbedded in
Article III of the Constitution, are unable to fully enforce, in the
specific context of litigation, the values, and even the actual require-
ments, of the Constitution’s substantive standards.143 The Consti-
tution holds all branches of the federal government, including
Congress and the President, to certain standards. If Congress or the
President breaches those standards, then Congress or the President
has violated the Constitution—has acted unconstitutionally. Even
so, it does not necessarily follow that the federal judiciary is capable
of providing a remedy for this unconstitutional conduct.144
The political question doctrine provides a classic example of a
barrier to judicial enforcement of constitutional norms and require-
139. See id. at 24-25.
140. Id. at 24.
141. See id. at 20.
142. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978).
143. Id. at 1221.
144. See id.
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ments.145 The Senate might violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him”146 in the
context of an impeachment trial when deciding whether to remove
a federal judge from office because of allegations of bribery, but the
Senate’s “sole Power to try all Impeachments” under Article I, Sec-
tion 3 precludes federal courts from enjoining the Senate’s compli-
ance with this Sixth Amendment right.147 Similarly, a U.S. citizen
has a Fifth Amendment right not to be targeted for assassination by
the President without “due process of law.”148 But if the President as
Commander-in-Chief in the Situation Room, upon advice from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and other national security advisers, orders the
targeted military killing of a U.S. citizen on the ground that this
citizen joined enemy forces waging war against America, then fed-
eral courts are powerless to intrude into those Situation Room
deliberations and order the President to refrain from exercising that
military judgment as Commander-in-Chief.149 This judicial power-
lessness exists in this particular factual context even if the nature
of the President’s Situation Room deliberations are inconsistent
with what the federal judiciary would otherwise insist that the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires before the U.S.
government deliberately kills a U.S. citizen.150
This judicial powerlessness does not mean that the constitutional
rights do not exist. Nor does it mean that these rights have not been
violated. It only means that these rights are judicially underenfor-
ced in the specific contexts in which the courts are incapable of
enforcing them.151 Clearly, these same constitutional rights are
judicially enforced in many other contexts: there are thousands of
federal court cases insisting upon compliance with the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. Still, these well-established constitutional rights
remain judicially underenforced in relation to their full scope—and
145. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (2006).
146. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
147. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
149. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2010).
150. See id.
151. See Sager, supra note 142, at 1221.
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in relation to the full demands they impose upon other branches of
government, whose officers have sworn obedience to the Constitu-
tion as a whole and who thus remain duty bound to obey the Consti-
tution’s full commands even to the extent that they are judicially
unenforceable.152
This concept of judicial underenforcement of constitutional norms
explains why the federal judiciary would be unable to fully elimi-
nate all partisan gerrymandering, yet at the same time have the
power to constrain especially egregious partisan gerrymanders. One
prong of the political question doctrine insists that courts employ
“judicially manageable standards” to enforce constitutional
norms.153 Yet, for reasons already explored in this Article, there may
be no judicially manageable way to distinguish excessive from ac-
ceptable levels of partisanship in the drawing of district lines.154 If
so, then the full extent to which partisan gerrymandering is actually
unconstitutional may be beyond the federal judiciary’s power to
remedy.
Notwithstanding this point, the First Amendment’s prohibition
against excessive partisan gerrymandering need not be entirely
unenforceable. Instead, there may be a judicially manageable way
to provide partial, although not full, enforcement of this important
First Amendment prohibition. A court that was capable of enforcing
this prohibition at least to some extent would, to be sure, be leaving
the prohibition underenforced. But in constitutional law, like else-
where in life, a partial loaf of bread is much better than none at all.
The particularistic mode of analysis, by using the original
gerrymander as the iconic benchmark of excessive partisanship, is
able to provide that partial loaf.155 It might be true that only a
universalistic approach to the issue of partisan gerrymandering
could enable a First Amendment prohibition against excessive
partisanship to be fully remediable. But if that universalistic
approach founders, because of a failure to provide a judicially
manageable metric to distinguish excessive from acceptable levels
152. See generally id. (arguing that Congress and state courts be able to enforce constitu-
tional norms even when the judiciary under enforces those norms).
153. Fallon, supra note 145, at 1276.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
155. See Foley, supra note 104, at 729.
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of partisanship, it does not follow that the effort to provide a judicial
constraint on partisan gerrymanders must be abandoned entirely.
Instead, a subset of unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders may
remain subject to judicial remediation—specifically the subset of
those gerrymanders at least as egregious as the original gerryman-
der. In sum, not all unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders will be
susceptible to judicial relief; the relevant First Amendment norm
will be judicially underenforced to that extent. Nonetheless, by
enjoining any gerrymander as egregious as the original one, the
federal judiciary would be enforcing the relevant First Amendment
norm to a considerable degree (just not completely). That judicial
underenforcement would be much better than no judicial enforce-
ment at all.
This concept of judicial underenforcement, as applied to the prob-
lem of partisan gerrymanders, should appeal to Justice Kennedy
given his opinion in Vieth.156 There, he wrote of partisan gerryman-
ders as definitely violating the First Amendment, with the problem
being that it just might not be possible for the courts to invalidate
all unconstitutional gerrymanders.157 If particularistic reasoning
provides Justice Kennedy a judicially manageable means to inval-
idate a significant subset of unconstitutional gerrymanders, he
should embrace that approach as satisfactory—and certainly as
preferable to judicial abandonment of the field entirely—even if it
leaves another subset of unconstitutional gerrymanders judicially
unreachable.
156. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
157. Justice Kennedy observed: “If a State passed an enactment that declared ‘All future
apportionment shall be drawn so as most to burden Party X’s rights to fair and effective
representation, though still in accord with one-person, one-vote principles,’ we would surely
conclude the Constitution had been violated.” Id. at 312. The difficulty was identifying those
other cases, short of this polar extreme hypothetical, that crossed the constitutional line of
impermissible “[e]xcessiveness,” which—as he also observed—“is not easily determined.” Id.
at 316.
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4. Elections Clause
A third possible basis for invalidating districts that are as dis-
figured as the original gerrymander is the Elections Clause in
Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution.158 This clause provides:
The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators
and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the
legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law
make or alter such regulations.159
This clause obviously gives states the power to draw congressional
districts, and it just as obviously gives Congress the power to re-
move that state power or to supersede it, including by Congress
either choosing to draw congressional districts itself, or else by en-
acting federal statutes that constrain or prohibit gerrymandering in
a state’s drawing of these districts.160 Although Congress undoubt-
edly has this power, Congress thus far has not exercised it, as
Justice Scalia observed in Vieth, at least not in the form of explicitly
outlawing gerrymanders.161
This observation, however, need not be the end of the matter. Just
because Congress has not explicitly invoked its power to regulate
interstate commerce in some specific respect, it does not follow that
a state is free to interfere with interstate commerce in this specific
way. Instead, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s “dormant Commerce
Clause” jurisprudence, the Court can invalidate a state’s practice as
antithetical to the underlying purposes of the Commerce Clause, at
least until such time as Congress, exercising its power under that
clause, chooses to validate the state’s seemingly inappropriate prac-
tice.162
Something similar is conceivable for the Elections Clause.
Gerrymandering, at least in forms as extreme as the original
gerrymander itself, is antithetical to the basic purpose of the
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 275-76 (plurality opinion).
162. See, e.g., Catherine Gage O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate
Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 623-24
(1997) (discussing theoretical justifications for dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
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Elections Clause, which is to provide the legislative authority neces-
sary to hold congressional elections so that Representatives may be
fairly chosen by “the people of the several States,” as specified in
Article I, Section 2.163 The “people” of a state cannot engage in this
function properly when congressional districts are as disfigured as
they were in the original gerrymander. Thus, gerrymandering by a
state to that extent must be an implicit violation of the Elections
Clause in the same way that protectionist state laws violate the
dormant Commerce Clause unless and until validated by Con-
gress.164 Indeed, the notion of a state exceeding its powers under the
Elections Clause by engaging in gerrymandering is analytically even
more sound than similar dormant Commerce Clause reasoning,
because a state has the power to engage in congressional districting
only because the Elections Clause gives it that power, whereas
states may regulate commercial activities pursuant to their general
police powers even without regard to the authority of Congress
under the Commerce Clause.165 Thus, the Court should be able to
find more readily that a state implicitly exceeded its Elections
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
164. Implied limits on gerrymandering under the Elections Clause, like implied limits on
protectionism under the Commerce Clause, with both forms of implied limits revisable by
Congress pursuant to its explicit legislative powers under both clauses, can be understood as
forms of what Henry Monaghan famously called “constitutional common law.” Henry P.
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975); see also Dan T. Coenen, The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible
“Semisubstantive” Constitutional Rules, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2835, 2890 (2009) (arguing, after
careful consideration, in favor of a “provisional, politically reversible style of decision making”
in various domains of constitutional law as consistent with a philosophically virtuous “spirit
of tentativeness” and “moderation”).
165. On the differences between the Elections Clause and the Commerce Clause for the
purposes of federalism, see generally Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114
MICH. L. REV. 747, 778, 782 (2016). The Supreme Court, moreover, in an opinion by Justice
Scalia, has explained why the Elections Clause is different for federalism purposes:
There is good reason for treating Elections Clause legislation differently: The
assumption that Congress is reluctant to pre-empt does not hold when Congress
acts under that constitutional provision, which empowers Congress to “make or
alter” state election regulations.... Moreover, the federalism concerns underlying
the presumption in the Supremacy Clause context are somewhat weaker here.
Unlike the States’ “historic police powers,” the States’ role in regulating congres-
sional elections—while weighty and worthy of respect—has always existed
subject to the express qualification that it “terminates according to federal law.”
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2256-57 (2013) (citations
omitted).
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Clause authority than the Court should be able to condemn a state
law on dormant Commerce Clause grounds.166 
In any event, this kind of Elections Clause analysis would be a
form of particularistic reasoning. What would be invalid as implic-
itly inconsistent with the basic purpose of the Elections Clause
would be distorted redistricting as egregious as the original gerry-
mander.167 This implication would derive from the original gerryman-
der’s special role in American history and the recognition of its
inconsistency with the Constitution’s expectation for a House of
Representatives appropriately elected by the “people” within each
state.168 To be sure, exercising its own power under the Elections
Clause, Congress could go considerably further and invalidate forms
of partisan redistricting not nearly so egregious as the original
gerrymander—just as Congress can go much further in protecting
interstate commerce than banning those protectionist state prac-
tices implicitly invalid under “dormant Commerce Clause” analy-
sis.169 Moreover, if it so chose, Congress could even decide to
explicitly approve distorted congressional districts as extreme as the
original gerrymander—although the evident inappropriateness of
so doing would likely prevent Congress from attempting such a
move.
Which mode of particularistic reasoning—Due Process, First
Amendment, or Elections Clause—is preferable? Given his con-
currence in Vieth, Justice Kennedy would likely find the First
Amendment approach most congenial, particularly as it is bolstered
166. It is no secret that some conservative Justices on the Court, especially Justices Scalia
and Thomas, have been hostile to dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence on the grounds
that it is inconsistent with basic federalism principles. Most recently, in Comptroller of the
Treasury v. Wynne, Justice Scalia continued to decry “how wrong our negative Commerce
Clause jurisprudence is in the first place.” 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas expressed a similar view. Id. at 1811 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Not all conserv-
atives, however, agree—as evidenced by the fact that Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion
in the same case, in which both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy joined. Id. at 1792
(majority opinion). In any event, as already explained, the federalism considerations are
entirely different with respect to the Elections Clause, compared to the Commerce Clause, for
reasons that Justice Scalia himself expressly recognized for the Court in Arizona v. Inter
Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
167. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
168. See id. art. I, § 2.
169. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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by the notion of “underenforced” constitutional norms.170 Yet, as
described at the outset, the key question—especially now that Gill
v. Whitford is pending before the Court—is not only what might
persuade Justice Kennedy, but also what has the best chance of
convincing future Justices, after Justice Kennedy leaves the Court,
not to abandon any precedent Justice Kennedy might set in the
meantime.171
D. Universalism, Particularism, and the Durability of Precedent 
Some Supreme Court precedents premised on universalistic
reasoning are capable of immense staying power. Reynolds v. Sims
is certainly an apt illustration of this fact.172 Its doctrine of “one
person, one vote” is entirely inconsistent with the jurisprudence of
originalism that arose in the 1980s, especially with the elevation of
William Rehnquist to Chief Justice and the simultaneous appoint-
ment of Antonin Scalia to the Court.173 There is no serious claim
170. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Sager, supra note 142, at 1213.
171. Insofar as using the original gerrymander to set the constitutional benchmark for
claims of improper partisanship in districting necessarily makes the constitutional standard
turn on deviations from traditionally appropriate districting criteria, one might think that
this approach conflicts with the Court’s recent decision in Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State
Board of Elections. See 137 S. Ct. 788, 802 (2017). But Bethune-Hill involved a racial, not
partisan, gerrymander, and as Justice Kennedy himself acknowledged in Vieth, race as a re-
districting factor has a very different—and inherently problematic—status in constitutional
law, compared to partisanship. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307. Because partisanship becomes consti-
tutionally objectionable only when it crosses a constitutional line of excessiveness, it makes
sense for identifying improper partisanship to turn on the distortion of district boundaries,
whereas the injection of race as a redistricting factor is unconstitutional whenever it controls
the drawing of district lines. (It is for this reason, and in this race-specific context, that the
Court in Bethune-Hill proclaimed: “The Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit misshapen
districts. It prohibits unjustified racial classifications.” Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 798.)
Moreover, to the extent that the constitutional prohibition against excessive partisanship in
redistricting is judicially underenforced because of the need for a judicially manageable
standard that falls short of reaching all constitutionally objectionable redistricting, see supra
note 143 and accompanying text, there is nothing anomalous about that judicially manageable
standard being grounded in the identification of extreme deviations of traditional geograph-
ical considerations, even if the theoretical characterization of the relevant constitutional
norm—without reference to the concern of judicial manageability—would be defined in ways
other than specifically geographical terms.
172. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
173. “Reynolds ... cannot be defended on originalist grounds.” William P. Marshall, Pro-
gressive Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the Significance of Landmark Decisions in
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that those who drafted or ratified the Fourteenth Amendment had
any intention to require states to comply with a federal requirement
of equally populated districts for their own state legislatures. As
Justice John Harlan observed at great length in his Reynolds dis-
sent, the Fourteenth Amendment specifically contemplates the deni-
al of equal voting rights (imposing only a consequence to the state’s
share of congressional representation for certain forms of electoral
inequality within a state), and at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification many states deviated from equally
populated districts in the apportionment of their own legislative
chambers.174 Moreover, there is no doubt that if originalists like
Justices Rehnquist or Scalia had been on the Court at the time of
Reynolds, they would have joined Justice Harlan’s opinion in repu-
diating the doctrine of “one person, one vote” as an entirely inappro-
priate and impermissible deviation from true constitutional
meaning.175
Nonetheless, Reynolds has never been overruled, nor its doctrine
of “one person, one vote” repudiated. On the contrary, it has been
reaffirmed repeatedly in every subsequent decade, including most
recently in a case where ambiguity in its theoretical underpinnings
was most directly exposed.176 Moreover, in 1989, when the newly
Evaluating Constitutional Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1267 (2011); see also Earl M. Maltz,
Inconvenient Truth: Originalism, Democratic Theory and the Reapportionment Cases, 86 MISS.
L.J. 1, 5 (2017) (“[F]rom an originalist perspective, the reasoning of the majority opinion in
Reynolds is impossible to defend.”).
174. At the outset of his dissent, Justice Harlan provided this overview:
[T]he Equal Protection Clause was never intended to inhibit the States in
choosing any democratic method they pleased for the apportionment of their
legislatures. This is shown by the language of the Fourteenth Amendment taken
as a whole, by the understanding of those who proposed and ratified it; and by
the political practices of the States at the time the Amendment was adopted.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 590-91 (Harlan, J., dissenting). He then elaborated on each point in
methodical detail. See id. at 593-615.
175. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 293, 304 (1976) (“[H]ad he been writing on a clean slate, Justice Rehnquist would have
agreed with Justice Harlan, dissenting in Reynolds v. Sims.”). In his separate concurrence in
Evenwel v. Abbott, Justice Thomas, the Court’s purest originalist, made clear his view that
Reynolds cannot be squared with originalism: “In my view, the majority has failed to provide
a sound basis for the one-person, one-vote principle because no such basis exists. The
Constitution does not prescribe any one basis for apportionment within States.” 136 S. Ct.
1120, 1133 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
176. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1124 (majority opinion); Nathaniel Persily, Who Counts for
One Person, One Vote?, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1395, 1397 (2017) (“[T]he Evenwel case provoked
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empowered originalist Supreme Court under the intellectual leader-
ship of Justices Rehnquist and Scalia had the opportunity to curtail,
or even just question, the reach of Reynolds—by refusing to apply
that precedent to the upper chamber of New York City’s legislature,
which was premised on a fair representation of each borough in that
unified five-borough metropolis—the conservatives on the Court de-
clined to do so.177 Instead, without any murmur or hint of discom-
fort, the conservative Justices joined forces with the Court’s liberals
in unanimously and vigorously forcing New York City to comply
with “one person, one vote” as if that doctrine was irrefutable con-
stitutional gospel.178 In this way, Reynolds demonstrated its en-
trenched durability as a precedent despite its initial dubiousness as
an exercise of constitutional interpretation.179
Not all precedents premised upon universalistic reasoning, how-
ever, fare as well as Reynolds. In Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, for example, the Court attempted to craft a doctrine rooted
in a universalistic idea that all governments, to be fair to all their
citizens, must be scrupulously neutral on matters of religious
faith.180 This attempt led to precedents such as County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, in which the Court prohibited a local government from
displaying a nativity scene to celebrate Christmas.181 Subsequently,
however, the Court has repudiated its insistence on religious neu-
trality—including the County of Allegheny precedent specifical-
ly—on the particularistic ground that such neutrality is inconsistent
with the long-standing American tradition of permitting local
some deep thinking about the values inherent in the one person, one vote cases.”).
177. See Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 690, 701 (1989).
178. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Byron White was hardly begrudging about
the Court’s duty to follow the Reynolds precedent; instead he extolled the philosophical
essence of the reasoning in Reynolds:
If districts of widely unequal population elect an equal number of represen-
tatives, the voting power of each citizen in the larger constituencies is debased
and the citizens in those districts have a smaller share of representation than
do those in the smaller districts. Hence the Court has insisted that seats in
legislative bodies be apportioned to districts of substantially equal populations.
Id. at 693-94.
179. Marshall, supra note 173, at 1267 (repeating this pithy quote: “Reynolds went from
debatable in 1964 to unquestionable in 1968” (quoting LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN
COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 255 (2000))).
180. I explored this point in a previous article. See Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism
and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 963, 965 (1993).
181. 492 U.S. 573, 579, 621 (1989).
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governments and their officials to utter proclamations that contain
explicitly sectarian invocations.182
Justice Kennedy, moreover, wrote the opinion for the Court that
repudiated County of Allegheny and its universalistic aspiration
that government always and everywhere maintain a posture of
strict neutrality on matters of religion.183 In Town of Greece v. Gal-
loway, the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a
local government’s practice of opening official meetings with explic-
itly sectarian prayers, and—through Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion—squarely and emphatically rejected the proposition “that
the constitutionality of legislative prayer turns on the neutrality of
its content.”184 Furthermore, insofar as County of Allegheny provided
support for that proposition, Justice Kennedy’s opinion made
abundantly clear its disavowal of that prior decision.185
In Town of Greece, Justice Kennedy relied heavily upon the
dissent in County of Allegheny, a dissent he happened to have
authored.186 The Court’s 5-4 decision in County of Allegheny had
Justice O’Connor joining the Court’s four liberals at the time (Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) to find unconsti-
tutional the local government’s nativity scene because it was an
official endorsement of Christianity.187 Justice Kennedy wrote the
dissent on this issue for himself and the Court’s three other con-
servatives (Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and White).188 Thus, Justice
O’Connor’s retirement and the appointment of Justice Alito in her
place is what permitted Justice Kennedy to turn his County of
Allegheny dissent into a majority opinion for the Court in Town of
Greece, which was also 5-4 but in the opposite direction.189 In this
respect, Town of Greece is just like Citizens United, and underscores
what Justice Kennedy surely understands: that any 5-4 decision he
were to write in Gill invalidating Wisconsin’s legislative map as an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander is potentially just as vulner-
able to a subsequent 5-4 undoing after he himself is replaced with
182. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819-20, 1825 (2014).
183. See id. at 1821.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 1819.
187. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 577 (1989).
188. See id.
189. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1815.
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a more conservative Justice, as County of Allegheny was undone 5-4
in Town of Greece.190
The key point here is that the universalistic nature of the reason-
ing in County of Allegheny did not protect it from being summarily
dispatched in Town of Greece once Justice Kennedy garnered a fifth
vote for his point of view on the issue of government prayer. As an
exercise of universalistic reasoning, County of Allegheny simply
lacked the inherent staying power that Reynolds possessed. The
“one person, one vote” doctrine quickly imbedded itself in America’s
constitutional psyche, and became an inherent and indispensible
element of what it means for America to be a democracy—and this
was true even though it had never been so previously.191 By
contrast, the idea that government should be steadfastly neutral on
matters of religion never took hold in America’s constitutional
psyche in the same way as “one person, one vote,” no matter how
sound that idea might be from a perspective of pure political
theory.192 The lesson of Town of Greece for Gill is that a condemna-
tion of partisan gerrymandering on universalistic grounds has no
assurance of surviving Justice Kennedy’s replacement (or Justice
Ginsburg’s, or Justice Breyer’s) with a conservative if that univer-
salistic reasoning is unable to quickly imbed itself in America’s
public self-understanding.193
As a general proposition, precedents rooted in particularistic
reasoning are more likely to have the kind of staying power that re-
sists subsequent overruling than precedents dependent upon uni-
versalistic reasoning. The explanation for this distinction is that
particularistic precedents, by being premised upon elements of
America’s cultural traditions, already have a head start on becoming
ingrained in America’s public understanding of its own constitu-
tional heritage.194 Heller is a clear illustration. By drawing explicitly
and extensively on America’s cultural tradition of gun ownership,
190. See id. at 1813-14, 1819.
191. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
193. Compare Marcus, supra note 29 (suggesting that Obergefell and other gay rights prece-
dents written by Justice Kennedy are so ingrained in our social fabric that in the future courts
will be reluctant to overrule or abrogate them), with Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816 (aban-
doning the universalistic precedent set in County of Allegheny, which did not become
imbedded in the public’s cultural self-understanding).
194. See supra note 34.
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the Court’s opinion in that Second Amendment case immediately
ensconced itself within that tradition and thus became an integral
part of the nation’s understanding of itself and its constitutional
law.195
Furthermore, conservative jurists are more willing to accept a
precedent that is explicitly premised on history and tradition, rather
than an exegesis of some universalistic proposition.196 For one thing,
a precedent rooted in the nation’s history and tradition is likely to
be narrower in scope—and also in potential implications down the
road—than a precedent sounding in some abstract universalistic
proposition—and for this reason alone more likely to appeal to
conservatives on the Court. For another, adherence to history and
tradition is inherently conservative in orientation, especially as
compared to considering the yet unrealized ramifications of univer-
salistic principles. Consequently, a particularistic precedent starts
off much more likely to be congenial to conservatives on the Court
than a universalistic one.197
The “substantive due process” holding of Moore v. City of East
Cleveland198 is a good illustration of this truth. The holding in Moore
invalidated a local zoning ordinance insofar as it prohibited a
grandmother from living in the same home as her grandchildren.199
Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion explaining the basis of this “substan-
tive due process” determination emphasized the deep-rooted his-
torical tradition within America of respecting the essential role of
grandparents in families.200 Justice Powell recognized that “[s]ub-
stantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this
Court.”201 But he stressed that those risks could be minimized by
195. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
196. See infra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., J. Richard Broughton, The Jurisprudence of Tradition and Justice Scalia’s
Unwritten Constitution, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 19, 22 (2000).
198. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
199. Id. at 499-500 (plurality opinion).
200. Id. at 502-04. Justice Powell’s opinion was a plurality for himself and three others. Id.
at 495. Justice Stevens joined the judgment of the Court, but relied on a separate and
idiosyncratic Takings Clause rationale. See id. at 513-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Powell’s plurality has since been taken as representing the narrower, and
thus controlling, opinion for the Court in the case. See Pala Hersey, Moore v. City of East
Cleveland: The Supreme Court’s Fractured Paean to the Extended Family, 14 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 57, 61 (2004) (“[H]istory has been charitable to the Moore plurality decision.”).
201. Moore, 431 U.S. at 502 (plurality opinion).
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confining “substantive due process” analysis to considerations of
history and tradition, rather than a search for abstract ideals.202
“Appropriate limits on substantive due process,” he observed, “come
not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful ‘respect for
the teachings of history.’”203 Conducting the appropriate historical
inquiry, Justice Powell found not merely that “the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,”204 but
more specifically—and thus much more relevantly—that “[t]he
tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents
sharing a household along with parents and children has roots
equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recogni-
tion.”205 In this way, the scope of the holding in Moore was cabined
by this specific historical finding206 and, for example, did not extend
to the right of a college fraternity to defeat a similar zoning
ordinance even if upon some universalistic logic the right of “frater-
nity brothers” to dwell together should be considered as just as
philosophically worthy as the status of grandparents and grandchil-
dren in a biological family.207
The particularistic reasoning of Justice Powell’s opinion in Moore
gave this precedent staying power that it would have lacked if the
opinion had relied upon universalistic reasoning to reach the same
result. For example, consider, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s treatment
of Moore in the major substantive due process case of Washington
v. Glucksberg, which involved physician-assisted suicide.208 Justice
Rehnquist dissented in Moore itself, based on his general hostility
as an originalist to the doctrine of substantive due process209—a
hostility Justice Rehnquist expressed in a variety of contexts, most
especially in abortion cases.210 Yet, when it came time for Chief
202. Id. at 502-03.
203. Id. at 503 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., con-
curring)).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 504.
206. Id.
207. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2, 8-9 (1974).
208. 521 U.S. 702, 710, 720, 727 (1997).
209. Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart’s dissent. Moore, 431 U.S. at 531 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
210. See, for example, Rehnquist’s dissent in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 953 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
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Justice Rehnquist to provide a general account of substantive due
process in the Court’s Glucksberg opinion, the Chief Justice turned
to Justice Powell’s opinion in Moore as the best and leading ex-
planation of the doctrine.211 Chief Justice Rehnquist did so specifi-
cally because Justice Powell’s reasoning in Moore had been
particularistic, rooted in history and tradition, rather than univer-
salistic (as some of the Court’s leading substantive due process
precedents had been).212 The particularism of Justice Powell’s
opinion in Moore, in short, was acceptable to the increasingly
conservative Court that had become dominated by Justices Rehn-
quist, Scalia, and other originalists.213 While not preferable to an
outright overruling of the entire substantive due process doctrine
from a perspective of originalist purity,214 the particularism of
Justice Powell’s approach in Moore was good enough, and thus could
be adhered to by conservatives given the value of sticking with
precedents that are not overly objectionable.
In light of all this, including the innate conservative preference
for particularism over universalism, a 5-4 precedent that holds a
partisan gerrymander unconstitutional is more likely to have the
kind of staying power that can withstand a subsequent 5-4 overrul-
ing after Justice Kennedy leaves the Court, if the precedent that
invalidates the partisan gerrymander is rooted in particularistic
rather than universalistic reasoning. There is also the basic point
that the public’s understanding of gerrymandering, such as it exists,
is rooted in the visual image of a gerrymandered district as a grossly
improper disfigurement of how the district should appear.215 This
211. In Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted Justice Powell’s opinion in Moore to lay
the foundation for his own analysis: “Our established method of substantive-due-process
analysis has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (quoting Moore,
431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion)).
212. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (extending the right to contra-
ceptives, previously applicable only to married couples, to unmarried individuals). This hold-
ing relied on general theoretical principles, not tradition. See id.
213. See Glucksburg, 521 U.S. at 710, 720, 727.
214. Justice Thomas, for example, would jettison “substantive due process” entirely on
originalist grounds, as he made clear in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 812 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
215. See supra text accompanying note 104; see also Foley, supra note 104, at 712-13.
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point is certainly true of the original gerrymander itself.216 Its
salamander shape, in addition to contributing to the practice’s
name, is what made it so objectionable in the public’s eyes.217
The same point is equally true for the contemporary public’s per-
ception of what gerrymandering is and why it is so utterly reprehen-
sible. Thus, when Jon Stewart’s Daily Show decided to cover the
topic of gerrymandering, it did so by lampooning the “art[istry]”
necessary to produce such grotesquely distorted congressional dis-
tricts as Illinois’s Fourth.218 It even concocted a gallery displaying
a collection of especially “creative” exercises in redistricting.219
Figure 3. Illinois’s Fourth Congressional District (as depicted on
Jon Stewart’s Daily Show)220
216. See Foley, supra note 104, at 712-13.
217. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; see also Foley, supra note 104, at 712-13
(describing the historical record on this point in more detail).
218. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: American Horrible Story—Gerrymandering
(Comedy Central television broadcast Dec. 10, 2013).
219. Id.
220. Id.
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Figure 4. “(Mis)Representations by Gerry Mander” (an art gallery
of egregious redistricting on Jon Stewart’s Daily Show)221
If a Supreme Court precedent invalidating a partisan gerryman-
der as unconstitutional is going to imbed itself into America’s polit-
ical culture, and do so quickly (before a future Court has a chance
to overrule that precedent), it most likely will attain this cultural
status by focusing on the public’s perception of gerrymandering as
visually grotesque.222 If the Court can root the unconstitutionality
of gerrymandering in this visual grotesqueness—gerrymandering is
unconstitutional precisely because, and to the extent that, it is
visually grotesque—then the Court’s holding will make sense to the
public and thus come to reflect the public’s own understanding of
the Constitution.223 The Court can achieve this linkage between the
gerrymander’s unconstitutionality and its visual grotesqueness
through straightforward particularistic reasoning: the original ger-
rymander was identified as an improper intrusion of partisanship
in the drawing of district lines because of its blatantly disfigured
shape;224 and thus, insofar as improper partisanship violates the
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See Foley, supra note 104, at 712-13 (noting that people found the original
gerrymander objectionable); see also The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: The American
Horrible Story—Gerrymandering, supra note 218 (demonstrating that people cannot even
identify shapes as congressional districts when they are not told what they are looking at).
224. See Foley, supra note 104, at 712-13.
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Constitution (either the First Amendment or another provision), the
disfigurement of the district in the original gerrymander—or any
equally disfigured district today—is unconstitutional.225
This is constitutional reasoning that the public can easily under-
stand and embrace, certainly more so than reasoning based on
arcane mathematical metrics like the efficiency gap or the mean-
median difference.226 Consequently, insofar as it will be more
difficult for a future conservative Court to uproot an anti-gerryman-
dering precedent that quickly becomes imbedded in America’s
cultural self-understanding (in the same way that Heller did227),
there is a greater chance of an anti-gerrymandering precedent pro-
tecting itself in this way by using particularistic reasoning premised
upon the visual grotesqueness of the original gerrymander and all
equivalent districting disfigurements, rather than a nonvisual
measurement of a districting map’s degree of partisan bias.228
In terms of the public’s willingness to embrace the proposition
that any districting as distorted as the original gerrymander is un-
constitutional, it probably does not matter whether that parti-
cularistic reasoning is rooted in the Due Process Clause, the First
Amendment, or the Elections Clause of Article I. As long as the
public finds persuasive the idea that the Constitution, in one
provision or another, renders invalid excessive partisanship in en-
acting the rules that govern electoral competition, then the public
would readily accept the subsidiary proposition that the original
gerrymander, and any other one at least as egregious, would qualify
as excessive partisanship. And insofar as the public has been school-
ed on the fundamental idea that the authors of the Constitution
were hostile to partisanship—an idea reflected in the Federalist Pa-
pers,229 which the public has been taught is an authoritative guide
to understanding the Constitution’s philosophical premises230—it
225. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
226. People denounced the original gerrymander as an “especially egregious weapon in this
partisan war,” Foley, supra note 104, at 712, while the complicated mathematical reasoning
of the efficiency gap theory has yet to gain acceptance by the American public.
227. See supra text accompanying note 26.
228. The nonvisual asymmetry approach has already proved unsuccessful. LULAC v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006) (Kennedy, J.).
229. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
230. See, e.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 249-56 (1969) (describ-
ing America’s embrace of two-party politics as a development of Jacksonian Era democracy,
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should not be difficult for the public to see one or more of the
Constitution’s clauses, or even the Constitution in its entirety, as
rendering excessive partisanship invalid.
We have already seen that Justice Kennedy would most likely
find the First Amendment as the most persuasive basis on which to
rest a particularistic account of why any districting as egregious as
the original gerrymander is unconstitutional.231 Compared to the
Due Process or Elections Clause alternatives, it is also possible that
conservatives on the Court might see the First Amendment as a
better basis for this kind of particularistic reasoning. After all,
conservative Justices—especially in recent years—believe in a
robust interpretation of the First Amendment in order to protect
disfavored political opinions from improper government discrimina-
tion.232
Yet some conservatives might prefer the due process approach. In
the same way that Moore was thoroughly rooted in historical
analysis,233 and thus necessarily cabined by that history, a due
process explanation for why the original gerrymander is unconstitu-
tional could be confined strictly to the specific historical condemna-
tion of that egregious map,234 along with any other that is equally
egregious. First Amendment precedents, even those rooted in
particularistic reasoning, have a way of expanding beyond their
initial contours.235 That tendency toward expansionism could make
judicial conservatives nervous, even if they might be otherwise
inclined to uphold First Amendment protections for unpopular
political beliefs.236 Consequently, on balance, conservatives might
see a precedent holding a partisan gerrymander unconstitutional as
being inherently more limited, and thus less potentially problematic
in contrast to the Founding Era hostility to factions and parties).
231. See supra note 170 and accompanying text; see also supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
232. See generally WAYNE BATCHIS, THE RIGHT’S FIRST AMENDMENT: THE POLITICS OF FREE
SPEECH AND THE RETURN OF CONSERVATIVE LIBERTARIANISM 99 (2016) (noting the Court’s
responses in various First Amendment cases).
233. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502-05 (1977) (plurality opinion).
234. See Foley, supra note 104, at 712-13.
235. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, although rooted in the unconstitutionality of the
Alien and Sedition Acts, quickly created an entire new body of defamation jurisprudence
within First Amendment law. See 376 U.S. 254, 273, 276, 283 (1964); BATCHIS, supra note
232, at 99.
236. See BATCHIS, supra note 232, at 99.
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down the road, if it were squarely rooted in exclusively historical
analysis under the Due Process Clause, rather than drawing upon
possibly expansionist First Amendment principles. 
Conservatives might be even more accepting of an anti-gerryman-
dering precedent that rested on the Elections Clause.237 Unlike
either a due process or First Amendment holding, a decision based
on the Elections Clause would be necessarily limited to congres-
sional districting and inapplicable to the districting of state legis-
latures.238 Also unlike either a due process or First Amendment
holding, Congress would be able to revise a decision based on the
Elections Clause for reasons analogous to dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, as previously explained.239 In these two
significant ways, an Elections Clause invalidation of a congressional
gerrymander would be much more limited, representing much less
of a judicial intrusion into the legislative prerogatives of a sovereign
state than judicial invalidation of a gerrymander on either First
Amendment or due process grounds. For these two reasons, an
Elections Clause invalidation of a congressional gerrymander ought
to be more congenial to judicial conservatives than either a First
Amendment or due process ruling. To be sure, judicial conservatives
have been hostile to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine on the
ground that it improperly interferes with sovereign legislative
power reserved to the states.240 But conservatives need not have the
same adverse reaction to judicial invocation of the Elections Clause
as a basis for invalidating gerrymanders absent congressional ap-
proval. As already explained, states have no inherent sovereign
power over congressional districts. Thus courts blocking congressio-
nal districts as egregious as the original gerrymander do not deprive
states of a right that pertains to their status as sovereign members
of the Union.241 It is only to prevent a state legislature from im-
properly interfering with structuring representation in a manner
that is in consistent with the Constitution’s original purpose, as
237. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
238. Since Article I of the Constitution deals with Congress’s powers, a decision based on
the Elections Clause would not apply to the actions of state legislatures, which do not derive
their authority from Article I of the Constitution. See id. art I.
239. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
241. See supra Part I.C.3.
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reflected in the design of the Federal House of Representatives
itself.242 Treating this improper interference as presumptively inval-
id—unless and until Congress itself specifically ratifies it as ap-
propriate—is in no way inconsistent with judicial conservatism.
Accordingly, a particularistic condemnation of partisan gerryman-
dering that rests on the Elections Clause might ultimately be the
mode of analysis most acceptable to conservatives on the Court, and
thus most resistant to subsequent overruling after Justice Ken-
nedy’s retirement.
In the end, however, it may matter less which clause the Court
uses as grounds for a particularistic condemnation of partisan
gerrymandering than that the Court chooses particularistic rather
than universalistic reasoning as its explanation for why partisan
gerrymandering is unconstitutional. If a particularistic condemna-
tion of partisan gerrymandering takes hold in the public imagina-
tion, and thus becomes entrenched in the public’s understanding of
the Constitution and the essential nature of American democracy,
then it may be difficult for conservatives to repudiate that particu-
laristic understanding regardless of whether it is technically linked
to the First Amendment, due process, or the Elections Clause of
Article I. Still, if one endeavored to write an opinion for the Court
that invalidated a partisan gerrymander in such a way as to maxi-
mize the likelihood that the opinion would resist overruling down
the road, one might be inclined to have the opinion rely specifically
on the Elections Clause. This opinion would emhasize exactly how
and why it was very narrow and limited in nature, invalidating con-
gressional districts only as egregious as the original gerrymander.
The opinion would explain that such districts were presumptively
inconsistent with the original idea that the House of Representa-
tives serve as the people’s chamber, at least until and unless
Congress itself approves such districts.243 One would write the
opinion in this way with the hope that, first, it would capture the
public’s imagination as an essentially correct exposition of what it
wanted its Constitution to mean and, second, future conservatives
on the Court would view the opinion as sufficiently acceptable as an
242. See supra Part I.C.3.
243. See generally supra Part I.C.3.
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exercise of constitutional interpretation that overruling it would not
be worthwhile, especially given the public’s embrace of it.244
II. WISCONSIN, MARYLAND, AND THE FUTURE OF GERRYMANDERING
LAWSUITS IN FEDERAL COURTS
It would be advantageous for the Court to write a particularistic,
rather than universalistic, opinion in holding a partisan gerryman-
der unconstitutional, in order to maximize the chances that this
opinion will not subsequently be overruled. But there is an obstacle
to implementing this objective. The Wisconsin case currently before
the Court, Gill v. Whitford (hereinafter Gill or the Wisconsin case),
does not lend itself easily to adopting a particularistic, rather than
universalistic, approach to the condemnation of a partisan gerry-
mander as unconstitutional.
The plaintiffs in Gill framed their case in universalistic terms and
did so by especially emphasizing the new “efficiency gap” method for
measuring a legislative map’s partisan bias.245 Although the district
court in ruling for the plaintiffs in Gill ultimately did not rely
exclusively on the efficiency gap metric,246 it nonetheless articulated
a universalistic test for detecting an unconstitutional partisan
244. Even if a precedent is not explicitly overruled, it can be narrowed considerably—or
eviscerated to the point that it is overruled all but explicitly. See Barry Friedman, The Wages
of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 &
n.4 (2010); Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
1861, 1863-64 (2014). But complete (and dishonest) evisceration is rare, and leaving the core
of a precedent intact even as its full reach is curtailed is far preferable—from the perspective
of the precedent’s defenders—than a complete overruling. Ask any defender of Roe v. Wade
whether the world is better off for the curtailment of Roe that occurred in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, or if it would have been just the same if the Court had
completely overruled Roe in Casey. Justice Blackmun, the author of Roe, himself supplied the
definitive answer to that question: “[J]ust when so many expected the darkness to fall, the
flame has grown bright.... Make no mistake, the joint opinion of JUSTICES O’CONNOR,
KENNEDY, and SOUTER is an act of personal courage and constitutional principle.” Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922-23 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, insofar as a precedent truly attains an
entrenched status in the public’s conception of the nation’s identity, it becomes harder to
eviscerate that precedent entirely by stealth measures, rather than pruning that precedent
of arguable excesses while leaving its essence intact.
245. See Plaintiff ’s Post-Trial Brief at 1, 10-11, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D.
Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017). 
246. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. at 903 (noting that evidence of “discriminatory effect” is “bol-
stered by the plaintiffs’ use of the ‘efficiency gap’”).
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gerrymander. According to the district court, a legislative map is
unconstitutional whenever it “(1) is intended to place a severe
impediment on the effectiveness of the votes of individual citizens
on the basis of their political affiliation, (2) has that effect, and (3)
cannot be justified on other, legitimate legislative grounds.”247
The district court’s test, moreover, like the plaintiffs’ proposed
approach, did not depend on a legislative map containing any mis-
shaped districts, much less ones distorted to the extent of the orig-
inal gerrymander.248 On the contrary, the district court explicitly
disclaimed: “[T]he defendants’ contention—that, having adhered to
traditional districting principles, they have satisfied the require-
ments of equal protection—is without merit.”249 In the Supreme
Court, the plaintiffs continue to defend this position: “aesthetically
pleasing districts nevertheless can be grossly gerrymandered,” the
plaintiffs argue, meaning that these districts despite being “congru-
ent and compact” and otherwise compliant with “traditional criteria”
still may be designed to achieve “partisan advantage” and be “highly
effective” in doing so.250
One might think that the Supreme Court, if it wished, could just
disagree with the district court and the plaintiffs on this point and,
of its own volition, adopt a constitutional standard that turns on
whether a legislative map contains egregiously distorted districts.
But there is an inherent structural impediment to the Court’s doing
so in the pending Wisconsin case. The Gill plaintiffs framed their
complaint as a statewide challenge to Wisconsin’s legislative map as
a whole, not as an attack on one or more specific districts within the
map.251 The Supreme Court could not simply affirm the district
court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiffs by relying on an alternative
approach that focused on the egregiously distorted shapes of parti-
cular districts, rather than partisan tilt of the statewide map as a
whole. Since the district court’s decree was an invalidation of the
entire map,252 as the plaintiffs sought, there would be a mismatch
247. Id. at 884.
248. See id. at 888-89 (“It is entirely possible to conform to legitimate redistricting purposes
but still violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the discriminatory action is an operative
factor in choosing the plan.”).
249. Id. at 889.
250. Motion to Affirm at 30-31, Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161 (U.S. May 8, 2017).
251. Complaint, supra note 64, at 29.
252. Amended Judgment, Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (No. 15-cv-421-bbc).
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between the remedy and the right if the Supreme Court, unlike the
district court, defined the relevant constitutional right as having a
district with boundaries free from partisan manipulation as egre-
gious as the original gerrymander.
Nor could the Supreme Court simply look to the record of the
Wisconsin case and fashion an alternative remedy in favor of the
plaintiffs that focused on the invalidation of specific districts, rather
than the legislative map as a whole. Given the way Gill was litigat-
ed at trial, there is not currently evidence in the record that would
permit the Supreme Court on appeal to hold that specific districts
in Wisconsin are distorted at least as much as was the original
gerrymander.253 At most, the Supreme Court could announce that
the correct constitutional standard is one that measures the distor-
tion of particular districts against the historical benchmark of the
original gerrymander and then, vacating the lower court’s decree,
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this correct
constitutional test. Of course, on remand, the lower court might rule
that the plaintiffs had missed their opportunity to present district-
specific challenges and evidence,254 but in this situation at least the
Supreme Court’s opinion would articulate a constitutional standard
showing what plaintiffs nationwide would need to do to be success-
ful in any federal court challenge to a partisan gerrymander.
There is, furthermore, another structural impediment inherent
in the Wisconsin case. If, as suggested above, the Supreme Court
wanted to rely upon the Elections Clause, rather than the First
Amendment or Due Process, as the basis for a judicially enforceable
requirement that congressional districts remain free from partisan
manipulation as severe as the original gerrymander, the Court
could not issue this holding in the Wisconsin case. Gill is a chal-
lenge, not to Wisconsin’s congressional districts, but instead solely
to the districting map for the state’s Assembly (the lower house of
the state’s own legislature).255 Thus, the Supreme Court cannot use
253. In their brief to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs acknowledged that they eschewed
any effort to attack specific districts in Wisconsin because of their distorted shaped. See Brief
for Appellees at 56-59, Gill, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2017).
254. The plaintiffs did not include any district-specific challenges in their initial complaint.
See generally Complaint, supra note 64. In Wisconsin, claim preclusion would bar new
litigation on this issue. See Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Arby Constr., Inc., 818 N.W.2d 863, 870
(Wis. 2012).
255. See generally Complaint, supra note 64.
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Gill to announce that the proper constitutional standard is one
derived from the Elections Clause and limited to congressional
maps.256 If the Court said this in its opinion in Gill, it would be pure
dicta,257 not a holding in the case. After all, the Court could not or-
der in Gill a remand for consideration of an Elections Clause chal-
lenge to the legislative map at issue in the case.
For all of these reasons, Gill is hardly the most desirable vehicle
for the issuance of an opinion that employs particularistic analysis
to condemn a partisan gerrymander as unconstitutional.
There is, however, a more promising case that has made its way
to the Supreme Court. Benisek v. Lamone (hereinafter Benisek or
the Maryland case) is a district-specific challenge to Maryland’s
congressional map.258 Thus, it squarely permits consideration of
whether specific congressional districts are unconstitutional for the
particularistic reason that they are more egregiously distorted than
the original gerrymander. Indeed, Maryland’s Third Congressional
District, the so-called “praying mantis,”259 and one of the most ex-
tremely disfigured districts currently in existence nationwide, easily
meets—or should one say “flunks”?—this historically rooted, parti-
cularistic test.260 Moreover, precisely because Benisek concerns
congressional districts, it would permit the Court to ground this
particularistic test in the Elections Clause, and in fact the Benisek
complaint includes an Elections Clause claim along with a First
Amendment challenge to Maryland’s gerrymandered congressional
map.261 
To be sure, the Benisek plaintiffs have focused their complaint not
on Maryland’s Third Congressional District, despite its being espe-
cially disfigured,262 but instead on the State’s Sixth Congressional
District.263 The reason is that the plaintiffs are emphasizing a First
Amendment theory that defines the harm from gerrymandering as
256. The Elections Clause, located in Article I of the Constitution, only imposes limitations
on actions of Congress, and not the States. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
257. See dicta, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969) (defining dicta as including
“ruling on an issue not raised,” which has no precedential effect).
258. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 3.
259. See supra Figure 2.
260. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
261. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 37-38.
262. See supra Figure 2.
263. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 3.
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the punishment of voters for previously electing a candidate from
the opposing political party.264 Maryland’s Sixth Congressional
District apparently fits that theory especially well.
But the theory has its vulnerabilities. Maryland, like every other
state, is obligated to draw new congressional districts every ten
years as a result of population shifts within the state.265 Given this
obligation, if there is nothing else wrong with the new districts that
the state draws, it is not clear that it would be unconstitutional for
a state to make one district less Republican, and another district
more Democratic, than the corresponding district in the previous
map had been. Republican voters, after all, are not constitutionally
entitled to live in a majority-Republican district; nor are Democratic
voters entitled to reside in a majority-Democrat district. There
needs to be something else wrong with the shape of the district, be-
yond the mere fact that it has fewer Republicans and more Demo-
crats, to make a district unconstitutional.
Even if this specific theory is weak, however, the Maryland case
remains a good one for the Supreme Court to expound a cogent par-
ticularistic account of why an egregiously distorted congressional
district is unconstitutional. Benisek is not confined to this specific
theory or even to only the State’s Sixth Congressional District.266 On
the contrary, the Benisek complaint explicitly covers all of the
State’s eight congressional districts and, with respect to the Third,
expressly attacks it as “the second most gerrymandered district in
the country.”267 Thus, despite the particular way the plaintiffs have
litigated Benisek so far, it would be fairly easy for the Supreme
Court to use this Maryland case to announce and apply a constitu-
tional standard that turned on the extent to which specific districts
were disfigured because of improper partisan manipulation.268
Consequently, if Justice Kennedy preferred to sustain a district-
specific challenge to a congressional district on particularistic
grounds concerning the district’s malevolently misshaped bound-
264. Id. at 5.
265. See generally supra text accompanying note 55.
266. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 3, 17, 21.
267. Id. at 21.
268. The Supreme Court has scheduled oral argument in Benisek on March 28, 2018. See
Benisek v. Lamone, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/benisek-v-
lamone/ [https://perma.cc/8U7B-LPKU]. Benisek is on appeal from the district court’s denial
of a preliminary injunction. See id.
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aries, he could do so in the Maryland case while simultaneously
rejecting the universalistic statewide challenge in the Wisconsin
case.269 These simultaneous rulings would certainly soften the blow
of the remand order, or even outright reversal, in Gill. Undoubtedly,
the major takeaway from such simultaneous rulings—and indeed all
headlines on the news accounts of them—would be that for the first
time, the Court identifies a winnable constitutional challenge to a
partisan gerrymander. The fact that one specific theory did not
prevail would be a far-distant secondary consideration compared to
the new development that a different mode of attack had finally
proved successful.
Thus, for all those who worry that the Wisconsin case is the last
chance for the Supreme Court to declare a partisan gerrymander
unconstitutional,270 it is worth remembering that the Maryland case
presents another opportunity. With the two cases at hand, the Court
can consider both in relation to each other. At the very least, the
Court should not dispose of Gill in such a way that would preclude
in Benisek, either by the Court itself or by the district court on
remand, further consideration of the district-specific claims that are
distinctive to Benisek and absent in Gill.
CONCLUSION
This moment in American history is, indeed, a special one in
terms of the opportunity to convince the Supreme Court that the
Constitution is properly interpreted to entail a judicially enforceable
constraint on partisan gerrymandering. But this special moment
should be understood more broadly than just the Gill case from
Wisconsin. Rather, the moment should be understood to encompass
also the Benisek case from Maryland.
The opportunity to convince the Court, moreover, should be
understood more broadly than convincing Justice Kennedy to join
the Court’s four liberals in identifying a standard for invalidating
269. One technical way the Court could accomplish this is to signal in its Gill opinion the
appropriate standard to apply is the one announced in Benisek and then remand Gill for
further consideration in light of the standard announced in Benisek.
270. See, e.g., Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, SCOTUS’s Last Chance to Rein in Partisan
Gerrymandering?, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 1, 2017), https://www.bna.com/scotuss-last-chance-
n73014453015 [https://perma.cc/GZL2-EZH9].
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partisan gerrymanders that all five of them embrace as judicially
manageable. Instead, this opportunity should be understood to en-
compass convincing conservative Justices, after Justice Kennedy
(and perhaps one or more of the Court’s liberals) have retired, not
to overrule a decision with which they disagree. Convincing Justice
Kennedy is but a Pyrrhic victory if his replacement joins four
conservatives on the Court to repudiate that decision in the Court’s
very next partisan gerrymandering case, just a few years later.
Thinking long-term in this way, one should quickly realize that
considering potential standards for invalidating partisan gerryman-
ders that the Court might accept as judicially manageable, further-
more, should not be confined to the kind of universalistic modes of
constitutional reasoning that conservatives abhor—modes of reason-
ing, for example, derived from abstract propositions of philosophy
or political theory. Rather, one should also consider possible
standards based on the kind of particularistic mode of reasoning
that conservatives favor: reasoning rooted in, and confined by, par-
ticular circumstances of America’s distinctive history and tradition.
Thinking along these lines leads one back to the original gerryman-
der and to the recognition that it can, and should, be the judicially
manageable benchmark for identifying unconstitutional partisan
gerrymanders.
